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INTRODUCTION
In 1978, NASA Langley Research Center undertook a project to
assess the risk associated with accidental release of carbon* fi-
bers during fires of commercial aircraft containing carbon-based
fiber/epoxy composites. Such fibers were known to be capable of
creating electrical malfunctions if ingested into electrical appa-
ratus and electronic controls.
Under Contract NASI-15238 the Bionetics Corporation supported
this effort by conducting analytic investigations of risk in spe-
cific areas, developing instrumentation and test facilities, ana-
lyzing data from field experiments and by designing and conducting
experiments evaluating the vulnerability of electronic apparatus.
Many of the results are contained in publications listed in this
report and in contributions to NASA status reports covering the
efforts over approximately a three-year period. This document de-
scribes accomplishments not otherwise reported in detail.
The report represents the combined work of the Bionetics
Corporation graphite fibers project staff, including Israel Taback,
Ansel J. Butterfield, Seymour Salmirs, Jerome A. Meyers, Cletus J.
Vincke, John S. Tanguy, James H. Schrader, Fred W. Phillips,
Gregory Schluge, Mark C. Harvey, Paul R. Hodges, Thomas N. Bartron
and Herbert F. Hardrath. The contributions of Arthur Newcomb,
NASA Technical monitor, whose guidance and suggestions are reflec-
ted in much of the work, are also acknowledged.
*Carbon-based fibers are often referred to interchangeably as
graphite or carbon fibers. In the strictest sense, graphite is
that form of carbon that is highly crystalline in structure. The
term "carbon fibers" has been used herein because it is the more
general term, and includes graphite and the less graphitic forms
commonly used in aircraft structural composites.
Section 1
CARBON FIBER CHARACTERISTICS
The vulnerability of electrical and electronic equipment to
carbon fibers is related to the length, electrical resistance and
burn-out characteristics of the fibers. Tests have been performed
to measure the resistance and burn-out characteristics of several
types of fibers. Tests have also been performed to assess the ex-
tent of physical breakup of fibers entrained in avionics equipment
cooling air during passage through jet engine compressor stages
and through avionics cooling air handling equipment. These tests
are reported in this section.
i.i ELECTRICAL RESISTANCE
Carbon fibers produced in an exploratory study by Celanese
Research Company were selected for a part of the Bionetics,
Incorporated, study on how fiber resistance affected equipment
vulnerability. The fibers, designated DG-II0, DG-II2 and DG-II4,
which had been developed to have unusually low thermal conductivity,
had unusually high electrical resistance. Sample fibers were
clamped gently across parallel conductors (spaced i0 mm apart)
made of gold or solder. Current was monitored during a test in
which 20-Vdc power was applied and the voltage was reduced by
3-Vdc steps. The slopes of the linear portions of the resulting
voltage-amperes plots were interpreted as the resistance of the
fibers. The curves were non-linear at low voltages because of
contact resistance effects. The voltage was subsequently raised
gradually until the fibers burned out.
Similar measurements were made on T-300 and GY-70 fibers
except that the burn-out amperage was noted after a constant
30-volt power was applied.
The results of these tests are presented in table i-i. The
resistances of the Celanese fibers were as high as 25 times those
of T-300 carbon fibers frequently used in structural applications.
The voltages at burn-out were also 2 to 3 times those of T-300,
but the current capacity was only 1/2 that of T-300. The use of
gold or solder conductors had no appreciable effect on results.
1.2 FIBER-BREAKAGE TESTS
The risk of failures in airborne avionic equipment was expec-
ted to depend critically on the likelihood of carbon fiber passing
intact through the ventilation system into equipment bays and the
flight deck. Accordingly, aircraft equipment ventilation systems
were reviewed. Typical ventilation systems receive high-pressure
air from one of the last stages of the compressor of an auxiliary
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power unit or a propulsion engine of the aircraft. The air is
cooled and filtered before passing into the ventilation ducts.
At its source, this air has passed through the inlet of the
engine, a distance of approximately 0.5 meters, and then through
24 to 30 right-angle turns as it passes through successive stages
of the compressor at speeds up to 186 m/s. Because of the tor-
tuous path, carbon fibers ingested with the air are quite likely
to impact duct walls, compressor rotor and stator blades and
filter faces before being released in the avionics bay. These
impacts may break fibers if speeds, directions and material prop-
erties occur in critical combinations.
Three simple, mathematically tractable, impact configurations
were treated analytically to explore whether potentially critical
conditions could be anticipated for T-300 fibers passing through
a jet engine compressor. To perform the analysis, all kinetic
energy in a fiber was assumed to be instantaneously converted to
potential energy of deformation in the fiber upon impact. Mate-
rial properties were assumed as follows:
Density of fibe_ p - 1760 kg/m 3
Modulus of elasticity, E - 236 GPa (34.2 x 106 psi)
Tensile strength - 2.9 Gpa (423,000 psi)
Compressive strength - 2.9 GPa (423,000 psi)
Stress-strain curve linear to fracture.
The fiber velocity, v, required to produce failure stress, S, for
each of the three conditions analyzed was:
Direct Compression
.½
v:S
= 112 m/s
Pure Moment
= 92 m/s
Impact at center of beam
v = 03s• \Ep J
= 33 m/s
These calculations demonstrated that fiber breakage was possible
at speeds and configurations encountered in a jet engine. Accord-
ingly, an experimental study was undertaken to simulate and ob-
serve the behavior.
Tests had been performed (ref. i-i) in which fibers were pass-
ed through a water separator and an aircleaner that are normally
installed in ventilation ducts• The same apparatus was used for
the present tests except that the bent tubes shown in figure i-i
were inserted between the tube into which fibers were injected
and the water separator that was used to catch fibers for analysis.
The earlier tests had shown that the water separator was an ef-
fective filter (passing less than 1% of fibers longer than 3 mm)
and that it captured fibers on its felt surface withoutsignificant
fiber breakage.
The bent tubes were designed to provide a path similar to
that followed by fibers passing through a compressor on a jet
engine. Three identical tubes having inside diameters of 11.2 mm
were mounted in the end wall of the injection tube.
Because air velocity in the injector tube (102 mm diameter)
was much lower than in the bent tubes, the fibers were accelerated
throughout their traverse of the tubes and exited the tubes at
approximately i00 times the entrance velocity. Fiber velocities
were calculated (ref. 1-2) to be in the range from 28 to 73 m/s
for air speeds of 131 to 312 m/s. The same calculation predicted
fiber speeds up to 122 m/s, in the compressor of a jet engine.
Early tests in this series employed virgin fibers chopped to
10-mm lengths. However, these fibers tended to clump and clog the
tubes of the simulator. Tests continued with 3-mm-long fibers
introduced and these tests were completed without clumping. Fiber
length varied somewhat because of difficulties with producing
chopped fibers of precisely uniform length and with cleaning the
test facility of the previously used 10-mm-long fibers. The
length distribution for one typical sample was:
Fiber length Percent
< imm 4.0
1-2 mm 6.7
2-4 mm 86.0
4-6 mm 2.8
> 6mm 0.5
Adhesive-coated paper was used to collect fibers from the
felt bag of the water separator used to trap fibers that had
traversed the tubes. Measurements of fragments revealed a very
large number shorter than 1 mm long. The numbers of fibers
counted with lengths less than 2 and 3 mm for each of five veloc-
ities are plotted in figure 1-2. Clearly, more fibers were broken
to shorter lengths at the higher velocities. No fibers longer
than 3 mm survived the test in which fibers travelled 73 m/s.
Considering that jet engine air velocities are considerably higher
than simulated in these tests, that the path through_a jet engine
entails many more changes in direction and that the water separa-
tors and air cleaners normally installed in ventilator systems are
excellent filters, the likelihood of ingesting carbon fibers into
ventilation and cooling systems is considered remotej
References
i-i Meyers, Jerome A.: The Transfer of Carbon Fibers Through
a Commercial Aircraft Water Separator and Air Cleaner. The
Bionetics Corp., NASA CR 159183, No.v 1979.
1-2 Hoerner, Sighard F.: Fluid-Dynamic Drag, 1965 Edition,
P. O. Box 342, Bricktown, N. J.
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TABLE i-i ELECTRICAL PROPERTIES OF SINGLE FIBERS
DG-II0 DG-II2 DG-II4 T-300 GY-70
Min. Resistance, M_/m 16. 1.4 7.5 .43 .22
Max Resistance, M_/m 32. 2.0 8.9 .46 .34
Mean Resistance, M_/m 20. 1.6 8.0 .44 .26
Mean Voltage at burn-out, Vdc 73 45 63 30(a) 25(a)
Mean Current at burn-out, mAdc 3.85 4.0 4.8 8.57 9.77
Mean Wattage at burn-out, W/m 28.1 18.0 30.2 25.7 24.4
(a) Applied voltages
TABLE 1-2 RESULTS FROM TURBINE SIMULATOR TESTS
Fiber
Air velocity
velocity at second % Fibers
in tube, turn,
m/s m/s £ <2 mm £ <3 mm
131 28 86 93
148 32 65 76
245 56 77 94
278 65 76 98
312 73 99 100
6
fInjectionTube,
102 dia.
11.2 dia.
16.5 R
5.3 R
7.6
Figure 1-1 - Turbine Blade Simulator
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Section 2
INSTRUMENTATION AND CALIBRATION TECHNIQUES
This section describes carbon fiber detection instrumentation
which was modified, developed and/or calibrated by the Bionetics
Corporation for use in (i) the NASA, Langley Research Center car-
bon fiber vulnerability exposure test facility (ref. 2-1), (2) the
fire-released fiber tests at the Naval Surface Weapons Center
shock tube facility (ref. 2-2), and (3) the large-scale outdoor
fire-released fiber tests at Dugway Proving Grounds (ref. 2-3).
A ball detector developed at the Ballistics Research Labora-
tory, BRL, (ref. 2-4) was used extensively in tests in the NASA
carbon fiber exposure test facility (ref. 2-1). The sensitivity
of the detector system was improved, the electronic circuitry was
modified and the ball was operated at lower voltage to eliminate
spurious noise. A procedure was developed to use the detector
for measuring fiber length spectra and the detector was recalibrat-
ed for exposure measurements at the lower charge voltage. A more
sensitive sensor using a wire rather than a ball detector was al-
so developed and calibrated.
The passive, sticky cylinder sampler (ref. 2-4) was also cal-
ibrated and used extensively for exposure measurement in the NASA
test facility (ref. 2-1) and in the Dahlgren shock tube tests (ref.
2-2).
An active detector system was developed for counting and mea-
suring the resistance of fibers released from burning composites.
This detector, which employs a comb-type arrangement of alternately
charged wires was used in the Dahlgren shock tube tests (ref. 2-2),
and the large scale tests at Dugway Proving Ground (ref. 2-3).
Results from calibration tests and fire-released fiber tests are
presented.
2.1 MODIFICATION OF THE BRL BALL DETECTOR
In order to adapt the BRL brass ball detector (ref. 2-4) for
use in the NASA vulnerability test facility (ref. 2-1) a three-
fold investigation was conducted in the following areas;
i. Noise reduction in the system.
2. Fiber length correlation.
3. Calibration of the ball for exposure measurements.
Noise reduction. - The basic element of the detector is a
38-mm diameter metallic ball charged to 1500 volts. Voltage pulses
are generated when conducting fibers strike the ball and remove a
small amount of surface charge. The number and amplitude of these
pulses is sensed and recorded to indicate the number and lengths
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of fibers detected. Figure 2.1-1 is a photograph of the ball de-
tector. Figure 2.1-2 is a schematic of the ball detector system.
In order to use the ball for length spectrum measurements,
the system had to be free of spurious noise pulses. If, during an
exposure, noise pulses of only a few millivolts occurred, they
would have been interpreted as short ( 2 to 3 mm) fibers. Elimi-
nating such small noise pulses was a difficult and frustrating job.
Several sources of spurious noise pulses were identified.
High-voltage cables and connectors were a prime source, particularly
if high-voltage signal lines and ground wires were closely spaced.
Any sharply pointed object, such as a poorly dressed connection
which had high voltage on it, could produce spurious noise pulses.
Excessive crimping of connectors could result in both sharp edges
and critically close spacings. Solder connections were found to
be preferable. The presence of dust or dirt in high-voltage con-
nectors or in the high-voltage section of the preamplifier also
created problems. An air blast was very effective in cleaning
high-voltage areas.
Another type of noise, a nonspurious type, was associated
with fibers which became lodged against the ball and were not re-
pelled. This usually took place around the ball's nylon mount and
was easily recognized by the fairly constant amplitude and frequen-
cy of the pulses. This type of noise also occurred if a fiber
lodged in the high-voltage section of the preamplifier. The only
cure was cleaning before each exposure.
As used by BRL, the ball was charged with 2000 volts. In an
attempt to lessen noise problems, several different ball voltages
were investigated. Lowering the charge to 1500 volts decreased
noise problems and resulted in a good tradeoff between performance
degradation and noise reduction. Lowering the voltage any further
would have reduced the ball's sampling effectiveness (see ref. 2-4)
noticeably in the fiber free-fall velocity range. All testing was
done at 1500 volts.
Fiber length correlation.- One of the initial objectives of
this work was to determine the ability of the ball to measure
length spectra. A simple relationship between fiber length and
pulse amplitude was developed to approximate predictions by
Bucher's equation (ref. 2-5). Also investigated was the presence
of low voltage pulses which occurred during fiber exposures.
The relationship (ref. 2-5) describing the charge transfer, °
Q, when a fiber strikes a high-voltage ball is,
i0
3_€ V L2 [1 - £n (i - _)]
Q o o= , (i)
2a(3 + _)2 [£n (_) - i]
where a = Ball radius, m (19 mm for the ball used)
L = Fiber length, m
V° = Ball potential, V (1500 volts used)
= L/a -12
s0 = Permittivity of free space, 8.85 x 10 F/m
R = Fiber diameter, m (8 p m for Thornel 300 fibers)
This relationship is cumbersome and involves many parameters
which were constant. Since the only variable using these fibers
was fiber lengths, the pulse amplitude resulting from charge trans-
fer was expressed in a simple power relationship,
Vp = K Lx (2)
where Vp = Voltage pulse amplitude, mV
K = System constant
L = Fiber length, m
x = Appropriate exponent
In figure 2.1-3, the feasibility of using this approximation
is demonstrated. The symbols represent predictions by Bucher's
equation arbitrarily normalized to a value of 0.001 volt at L = 1
mm. The straight line represents equation 2 and is a good fit for
the form of Bucher's equation. The exponent required, over the
range from 1 to 20 mm is 2.34. Therefore, equation 2, adjusted
to this case, is
Vp = K L2"34 (3)
Experiments were conducted to determine the voltages corre-
sponding to impacts of fibers with known lengths. Typical values
are given in the following table:
Fiber length Pulse amplitude
mm mV
4 50
8 310
12 800
Equation 2 fits these data best when K = 1.53 and x = 2.52 giving
Vp = 1.53 L2"52 (4)
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This equation was used to convert voltage pulses to fiber
lengths for exposure tests. The value of K for a given system de-
pended on both the type of preamplifier and the cables used. How-
ever, by making several calibration runs using known fiber lengths,
the proper constant for each system was determined.
Equation (4) was used to convert the observed spectrum of
voltage pulses to a fiber-length spectrum. However, spurious noise
caused problems at the low-voltage end of the pulse spectrum. An
example of this is shown in figure 2.1-4. The very high numbers
of counts at low voltages were not consistent with the expected
number of short fibers, but they occurred only during fiber expo-
sure. These low-voltage pulses usually occurred at levels equiv-
alent to those caused by fibers at least 2 or 3 mm long. This put
a lower bound on the lengths of fibers that could be measured ac-
curately. Another problem was the broad range of the voltage
pulses that needed to be measured. From the foregoing data one
can see that if both 4 and 12 mm fibers were present in an expo-
sure, the expected pulses would be concentrated at 50 and 800 mV.
At gain settings suitable for 800 mV, resolution of 50-mV pulses
was poor. Also, the low-voltage noise was large enoughto distort
and sometimes totally swamp the 50-mY pulses of the 4-mm fibers,
if present.
Accordingly, the ball detector was considered to be an ac-
ceptable instrument for measuring fiber length spectra, but only
for fiber lengths greater than 4 mm.
Calibration. - Fiber samplers inherently count the number
of fibers passing through their effective frontal area in some
prescribed time interval. The number of fibers counted is obvi-
ously dependent upon the effective area of the sampler, the con-
centration of fibers in the fiber stream, the velocity of the
stream, and electromagnetic forces that modify the particle tra-
jectory.
The calibration standard used in this investigation was
"bridal veil." This is a nylon mesh fabric having approximately
hexagonal apertures measuring about 1.5 mm between parallel sides.
The veil was coated with a tacky substance to capture fibers that
came into contact with the mesh. The device was assumed to cap-
ture all fibers longer than 4 mm (see reference 2-6 for mesh cali-
bration data) and to have no significant sensitivity to velocity
of the stream or electromagnetic effects. Fibers captured by the
veil were counted manually after exposure.
The BRL ball detector required an independent calibration be-
cause the charging voltage was different than that used by BRL
(1500 volts vs. 2000 volts) and because trajectories of the fibers
around the ball were expected to be sensitive to both velocity
and electric charge on the ball. The calibration device shown
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in figure 2.1-5 was used to calibrate the ball detector. A motor-
driven fan controlled the downward velocity through a vertical
duct and assured reasonably uniform flow past the detector. Fibers
of known lengths were introduced at the top of the duct. The ball
detector was mounted above the bridal veil sampler on a support
that pierced the veil at its center. Fibers that impinged on the
ball were assumed to be repelled without modifying the distribution
in the airstream.
The number of fibers deposited on the veil were directly re-
lated to counts of voltage pulses on the ball sampler because the
environments for the two devices were identical.
Typical results are portrayed in figure 2.1-6 for two experi-
ments in which fibers either 4 mm or 8 mm long were introduced
into the calibration chamber and the velocity of the airstream was
varied systematically. The calibration constant, K, for each step
of the experiment is plotted against the velocity of the airstream.
The calibration constant relates the pulses detected by the ball,
_, to the exposure, E, by the simple equation:
E = K xb (5)
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2.2 CHARGED WIRE DETECTOR
The charged ball detector discussed in section 2.1 is not
suitable for sensing short (i mm) fibers because of insufficient
signal-to-noise margin. A wire sensor was conceived and developed
to replace the charged ball sensor in the ball detector system.
The wire sensor consists of a straight tinned copper wire 153 mm
long, and 0.51 mm in diameter. The longitudinal axis of the wire
was mounted normal to the fiber flow direction. The wire sensor
was interchangeable with the ball sensor on the ball sensor
attachment base. No modifications were required in the ball
detector electronics system when the wire detector was used.
A photograph of the charged wire detector is shown in figure 2.2-1.
The relative sensitivity of the wire and ball detector in the
1-to 3-mm fiber-length range is shown in the following tabulation
of detector system output voltage levels.
Output Voltage, mV
Fiber Length Ball Sensor Wire Sensor
1 mm 1.25 40
2 mm 7.2 i00
3 mm 20.0 171
The wire detector was initially calibrated for i- and 2-mm-long
fibers and subsequently for 3-mm-long fibers. Although the cali-
brations were all referenced to fiber deposition measurements,
a different deposition measurement technique was used for the
3-mm calibration. Therefore, the calibration for i- and 2-mm-
long fibers is discussed separately from the calibration for the
3-mm-long fibers.
The wire detector was calibrated for i- and 2-mm fiber lengths
in a fiber free-fall environment using sticky paper deposition
samplers as a reference. Each test run used two wire detectors
and three 50 mm by 50 mm sticky paper samplers. Because a large
number of fibers were deposited in the tests, only portions of
each sticky paper were counted for fibers. The exposure measured
by the sticky papers was calculated based on a 25 mm/s fiber
free-fall velocity and the following relationship,
D N (i)
m =
v Av
where E = Exposure, fiber-sec/m3
D = Deposition, fibers/m2
v = Fall velocity, m/sec, (.025 m/s)
N = Fiber count
A = Area counted, m2, (2.83 × 10-4 m2)
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N m3thus E = 2.83 x 10-4 x .025 = 1.414 x 105 N, fiber-see/
By relating the exposure determined by the sticky paper dep-
osition samplers and the wire detector pulse count indications,
the wire detector calibration constant, Kw, as contained in the
following expression, was determined.
E =Kw Nw (2)
where E = Exposure, fiber-sec/m3
Kw = Exposure calibration constant
Nw = Fiber counts indicated by detector system
N
Letting Kw Nw = _ , from (i)
N 1.414 x 105NK = =
w N Av N
w w
Test data and resulting values of K for each test are shown inw
table 2.2-1.
The average Kw for l-mm-long fibers was 6.7 × 103 sec/m3
and for 2-mm-long fibers was 5.26 x 103 sec/m3.
A typical pulse amplitude spectrum resulting from the wire
detector tests for l-mm-long fiber is shown below. The variation
in pulse amplitude is attributed primarily to variations in
orientation of fibers hitting the wire detector and to small vari-
ations in fiber length produced by the fiber chopper used in the
NASA vulnerability exposure test facility (see ref. 2-1). For the
tests with l-mm-long fibers, in table 2.2-1, only pulse amplitudes
greater than 20 mV were counted, and all were assumed to be caused
by l-mm fibers.
Counts
0 20 40 60 80
Pulse Amplitude, mV
The wire detector was subsequently calibrated for 3-mm-long
fibers using bridal veil mesh deposition samplers as a reference
rather than sticky paper deposition samplers. The bridal veil
mesh was similar to that described in section 2.1. Four open-
ended, hollow cylinders, 115 mm in diameter by 160 mm long with
bridal veil mesh covering one end were placed mesh end down on
a table around the wire detector.
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Due to the large number of fibers deposited on the mesh sam-
plers, the line intersection counting technique discussed on paqes
32 and 33 of reference 2-6 was employed. A single line i0 mm
long was chosen and the average of 5 repetitive countings was used
to determine the number of intersections, I, for a given sampler.
The estimate of fibers deposited in a unit area was then determined
in accordance with reference 2-6 to be,
NT I
- (3)
AT 2 £ L
where NT = Total number of fibers in area AT2
AT = Area, m
I = Number of fiber intersections
£ = Fiber length, m
L = Length of line on which intersections are counted, m
NT
Since -- is also fiber deposition, D, and from (i), exposure,
AT
D
E - , then
v
IE = 2 £ L v
I
2 x .003 x .i x .025
= 2.09 × 105 I
and from (2) E = K N , then
w w
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K N = 2.09 x i0 I, and
w w
52.09 x 10 IK =
w Nw
Test data and resulting values of K for each of the 3-mm-
fiber tests are shown in table 2.2-2. w
for 3-mm-long fibers was 5.9 x 103 sec/m3.The average Kw
In addition to calibrating the wire detector for use with
i, 2, and 3 mm virgin fibers, an investigation was conducted to
determine the suitability of the detector for use in a soot-laden
environment to detect fibers released from burning composites.
The detector was found unsuitable for this purpose. Signals gen-
erated by soot particles from burning JP-4 fuel were virtually
indistinguishable from signals generated by virgin one millimeter
carbon fibers. The investigation which led to the above conclusion
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is described below.
The wire sensor was placed at the bottom of a metal trash
can. An oscilloscope was connected to the sensor electronics out-
put. With the oscilloscope display as a reference, a threshold
of twenty millivolts (equivalent to that used for counting l-mm
fibers) was set in the portable ball discriminator.
A rich mixture of JP-4 was burned to produce dense sooty
smoke which was directed into the can containing the wire sensor.
Counting of particles began almost immediately and within a few
seconds reached an average of 270 contacts per second. Simultane-
ously, short rise-time pulses were seen on the oscilloscope.
Raising the discriminator threshold to about twenty-three milli-
volts eliminated counting. As the sensor with its attached ampli-
fier became covered with soot (after about one minute), the sensor
output ceased. Subsequent cleaning of the sensor and its amplifier
was sufficient to restore the sensor to operating condition.
Heating effects on the sensor were not considered to be re-
sponsible for the output signal observed during the first minute
of exposure to the smoke. Temperature in the can was not monitored
during the test described above but was monitored in a later similar
test. When the smoke was directed into the can, the temperature
rose gradually from 300K to a peak of 443K in about six minutes.
During the first minute of the sensor test, the temperature in the
can was under 323K.
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TABLE 2.2-1 WIRE DETECTOR CALIBRATION DATA FOR 1-AND 2-MM FIBERS
Pulses Counted by Fibers Counted on
Test Fiber Wire Detectors, Sticky Papers, N AverageN
# Length w Calibration
mm #i #2 #i #2 #3 Constant, Kw*
3
1 1 124 182 5 13 7 7.4 x 10 -
32 1 363 386 32 14 23 8.7 x i0
3
3 1 761 832 23 32 37 5.5 x 10
3 '
4 1 697 400 9 21 39 5.9 x 10
3
5 2 590 400 16 22 30 6.5 x 10
3
6 2 ii00 990 48 47 33 5.8 x i0
3
7 2 881 780 23 33 16 4.1 x i0
3
8 2 610 574 ii 20 32 5.0 x i0
1.414 × 105 N
*K =
w N
w
TABLE 2.2-2 WIRE DETECTOR CALIBRATION DATA FOR 3-MM FIBERS
Pulses Counted Fibers Intersecting i00 mm AverageCalibration
Test by Line on Bridal Veil, I Constant,No. Wire Detector,
Nw #i #2 #3 #4 Kw*
1 629 14 28.4 28 ii 6.8 x 103
2 727 12.8 26.4 26.4 ii 5.5 x 103
3
3 • 1012 22 34.8 25.8 8.6 4.7 x i0
4 848 32.8 36.8 32.4 15.6 7.2 x 103
2.09 x 105I
•K =
w N
w
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Figure 2.2-1 - Charged-wire detector
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2.3 STICKY CYLINDER CALIBRATION
Sticky cylinders were constructed from 50-mm-squares of 0.5-
mm-thick adhesive-coated polyester film. The transparent film
was rolled, adhesive side out on a 13-mm-diameter mandrel to form
the cylinders. The overlapping edges of the film were joined by
the adhesive coating. The cylinders were supported in the flow-
stream by mounting to a wire as shown in figure 2.3-1.
The form of the relationship between exposure, E, and the
number of fibers on a cylinder exposed to a fiber cloud is
E = K X , fiber-seconds/m3sc
where K is a calibration constant and X is t_henumber of fibers
s
counted. Thus, a cylinder measures exposure directly with only
the proper constant needed for the conversion. Several experiments
were conducted to determine the value of K and to ascertain its
relationship to fiber length and to airspeed.
To determine K, the test set up of figure 2.3-2 was used.
For each test, cylinders were placed in the calibration chamber,
152 mm below the center of the ball detector. Airflow was normal
to the longitudinal axis of the cylinders. Fibers 4 or 8 mm long
were introduced at the top of the chamber. Air velocity past the
samplers was varied from 0 to 1.5 m/s. After each exposure the
cylinders were cut at the overlapping joint and unrolled. The
adhesive side was pressed against a secondary transport film or
a glass slide. This protected and preserved the captured fibers
and prevented other contamination. Fibers were then counted under
a microscope or from projected images of the film. The slide area
counted was 40 mm square. Using the exposure given by the ball
detector (which had been calibrated in accordance with section
2.1), the value of K was determined. The resulting plot of K is
shown on figure 2.3-3.
As shown on the curve, data in the range of fiber free-fall
velocity (0.025 m/s), are scattered more than those measured at
higher velocities. Also, in the range of free-fall velocity, K
is much more sensitive to velocity than at the higher velocities.
Since the sensitivity of K to velocity is low at the high veloc-
ities, a value of K = 2 × 103 sec/m3 was used at velocities above
0.25 m/s. Similar calibration work was performed by BRL (ref.
2-4), utilizing a somewhat different test arrangement and for 7
mm fibers. The results of the BRL work indicate a K, as used
above, of approximately 3 times the value determined from the
Bionetics tests. This difference may have been caused by the
different orientations of the sensors with respect to the fiber
flow direction in the two calibrations. The K value derived here
was accepted because, in use, it led to higher vulnerability
assessments for equipment than would have resulted from use of the
BRL calibration.
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Figure 2.3-1 - Sticky cyl'nder sampler
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Figure 2.3-3. - Exposure calibration constant for sticky cylinders
2.4 WIRE-GRID FIBER SENSORS
The wire-grid fiber sensor was developed primarily for the
purpose of measuring the electrical characteristics of fire-re-
leased carbon fibers. However, it was also used to measure the
time histories of carbon fiber concentrations and exposures in the
plumes of a number of fire tests. The relationship of the elec-
trical characteristics (resistance and burn-out power) of fire-
released fibers relative to virgin fibers was required to interpret
the results of equipment vulnerability tests using virgin fibers.
The electrical characteristics of virgin fibers have been measured
for a number of fiber types as reported in section i.i. However,
because of the difficulty of collecting, isolating, and measuring
electrical characteristics of individual fire-released fibers, in
situ measurement of these characteristics was considered necessary.
Sensor description.- The sensor developed in this effort
consisted of a wire comb assembly, shown in figures 2.4-1 and
2.4-2, connected to an electronic assembly, illustrated in figures
2.4-3, 2.4-4, and 2.4-5. The wire comb consisted of a number of
parallel steel wires (approximately 0.75 mm dia. and 90 mm length)
mounted at their mid-point in a single plane through a printed
circuit board with 2 mm center-to-center spacing. The etched
pattern on the board was such that when a voltage was applied to
the two input electrodes, that voltage would appear between any
two adjacent wires. The wire grid (fig. 2.4-1) used in the
Dahlgren tests (ref. 2-3) had a total area of approximately .015
m2 and the grid (fig. 2.4-2) used in the Dugway tests had a total
area of .044 m2. As shown in figure 2.4-3, these wire grids were
connected to the grid monitor and switch unit shown in figure
2.4-4. This unit had a separate circuit for each of eight grids
which either applied a 250 Vrms, 60 Hz signal to the grid or con-
nected that grid to the scope interface unit (fig. 2.4-5) depending
on the position of the manual selector switch for that grid. The
250-Vrms signal was maintained on the grid for the purpose of burning
out any fibers which intercepted the grid, and had a 10-ohm re-
sistor in series to provide an output voltage for recording the
number of fibers which intercepted the grid. The scope interface
unit, in conjunction with the x-y oscilloscope, provided the
capability for measuring and recording the voltage-current char-
acteristic during burn-out. This unit maintained a high-voltage
(200 Vdc), high-impedance source connected to the grid until a
fiber intercepted the grid, at which time the scope sweep circuit
was triggered and a ramp voltage was applied to the interface
unit increasing the current until the fibers burned out. The
monitor outputs were applied to the x and y inputs of the oscillo-
scope, producing a plot of the voltage-current characteristic
to burn-out as shown in figure 2.4-6. Figure 2.4-6a shows a
calibration where the grid was replaced with a 500-ohm and a 1000-
ohm resistor, and figure 2.4-6b shows the actual characteristic
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of a fiber interceptedand burned out during Dugway test D-2 (ref.
2-3).
Calibration. - A series of calibration tests were conducted
to determine the efficiency factor as a function of the velocity
of the fibers relative to the grid. The data acquired in these
tests are given in Table 2.4-1. All tests were conducted in the
Langley Research Center fiber chamber (ref.2-1) with virgin T-
300 fibers, cut in 3-mm lengths, injected into the chamber with
resulting fiber concentrations of approximately 104 fibers/cubic
meter.
The static calibrations consisted of a comparison of the
number of fibers, Nv, collected on a bridal veil relative to the
number of fibers, N , burned out on a grid mounted directly ad-
jacent to the brida_ veil, over the period 9f the test (approxi-
mately i000 sec.). The number of fibers, N , expected to pass
through an area equal to the area of the gr_d, based on the fiber
deposition on the bridal veil, was determined as follows_
, A 2
N = N _9__ A = 0.044 m
g 2g v Av A = 0.000955 m
v
where A is the area of the bridal veil over which the fibers
v
were counted, and Ag is the area of the wire grid. The collecting
efficiency (F) then is simply the ratio of the actual sensor counts,
Ng, to the expected sensor counts, Ng, and is approximately 0.7q as shown in table 1.4-1a.
Dynamic tests were performed by installing the grid on a
pendulum as illustrated in figure 2.4-7. A fiber count (N_ static)
was obtained with the grid oriented horizontally (position_l).
The grid was then released and allowed to swing through an arc
to position 3 with a measured period and another fiber count (N
dynamic) was obtained. The radius of swing was 0.846 meter in g
all cases. Upon release from position i, the grid almost imme-
diately assumed a position such that the axis of swing lay in or
close to the plane of the grid face during the entire swing.
Some problems were encountered in these tests due to the
nonuniform distribution of fibers within the chamber. Consequently,
a series of tests were conducted to determine the approximate
ratio of the average fiber concentration over the path of the
grid during the swing to the fiber concentration at position i.
Bridal veil was used to measure the fiber deposition Nv(1), Nv(2),
Nv(3) over a period of time at positions i, 2, and 3 in figure
2.4-7. A chamber correction factor (Fc) was calculated as follows:
N (i) + N (2) + N (3)
v v vF =
C 3 N (i)
v
31
The results of these tests are given in table 2.4-1, and yield
a correction factor of 1.93.
The results of the dynamic tests are given in table 2.4-1c
at three different velocities as indicated. A velocity correction
factor (Fv) was determined for each series of tests as follows
N (d) Vf TF = --g T = 200 sec.
v N (s) r 0 F
g c Vf= 0.025 m/sec. :
F = 1.93
c
where N (s) was the count over a period of time (T) prior to theg
swing, Ng (d) was the count during the swing, Vf is the free-fall
velocity of the fibers, r is the radius and 0 is the arc through
which the grid was swung. The radius of the pendulum (0.846 m)
and the time, T, were chosen to make the number of counts N (s)g
and N (d) equal if no velocity effects were present.g
The resultant values of F (0.81, 0.96, 0.96) are closev
enough to unity that, considering the experimental uncertainties
involved, the sensor was considered insensitive to relative ve-
locity for velocities of up to 4 meters/second.
In addition to these laboratory tests, one fire test (#54)
was conducted at Dahlgren to determine the sensitivity of the
instrumentation to particulates, other than carbon fiber, which
may be emitted from such a fire. In this test, a sample of ma-
terial (glass fiber/epoxy matrix) was burned which contained no
carbon fiber. During the 105 min. burn, 15 counts were indicated
on the sensor. This number of counts is negligible compared to
the corrected total count (44,000) obtained from test #53 where
graphite/epoxy was burned in a similar test.
Results.- A number of experiments were conducted using these
sensors. First, a series of experiments were conducted in the
laboratory to measure the electrical characteristics of both G.Y.-
70 and T-300 chopped virgin fibers. Second, the sensors were used
in a series of fire experiments to determine the fiber concentra-
tions and exposures obtained in these fires. A series of labo-
ratory measurements on fibers from debris collected after the
Dugway fire were subsequently conducted to evaluate the electrical
characteristics of fire-released fibers.
In conducting the laboratory experiments, fibers were re-
leased in a closed chamber containing a grid. They were then
distributed within the chamber by a blast of forced air and
allowed to fall freely to the chamber floor during which time a
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number of fibers intercepted the grid. Figure 2.4-8 shows the
distribution of measured resistances of GY-70 and T-300 virgin
fibers. These resistances were derived from the voltage and cur-
rent at fiber burn-out and are for fibers bridging a 2-mm gap.
The mean resistance of the GY-70 fibers was 307 ohms, based on
14 samples of data. For the T-300 fibers, the mean resistance
was 1590 ohms, based on 54 samples of data.
Measurements were also made on some burned T-300 fibers.
Some fibers were burned in a laboratory oven, and some burned
fibers were obtained from debris collected after the Dugway fire
(test D-2). These fibers were measured in the chamber and
inspected microscopically. Figure 2.4-9 shows the distribution
of the diameters of these burned fibers. In these distributions,
all fibers with diameters greater than 6.5 um were included in
the 6.5 to 7.0 _m bin although some exceeded 7.0 _m diameter.
The distributions of resistances were predicted from the diameter
distributions on the assumption that resistance was inversely
proportional to cross-section area of the fibers. That is:
 0(7 0)
Figure 2.4-10 shows the measured and predicted distributions
of resistances for the oven-burned fibers. Microscopic inspection
of these fibers revealed they were not typical of fire-released
fibers observed in both the Dahlgren and Dugway fires in that they
were much more uniform in diameter and length than those obtained
from the fires.
Figure 2.4-11 is a histogram of resistances measured by the
grid and resistances predicted from optical measurements of fibers
taken from Dugway debris. The mean grid-measured resistance was
3924 ohms, based on 145 measurements. Because all fibers found
optically to have diameters greater than 6.5 _m were counted in
one bin, all fibers with measured resistances less than the
resistance of 6.5 um fibers (1844_) should also be placed in one
bin, as indicated by the arrow. Measured resistances as low as
600_ imply diameters as large as ii um, an unlikely diameter.
During optical measurements, double fibers, adhering firmly to
each other, were noted. These were excluded from the optical
measurements. The abnormally low grid-measured resistances most
probably were the result of the grid encountering a few twin or
triplet fibers. The good agreement between the two resistance
distributions at higher resistance levels (smaller diameters)
supports the assumption that resistance is inversely proportional
to cross-section areas, as expected.
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A preliminary analysis of earlier data, reported in reference
2-7, suggested that the reduction of diameter produced by burning
did not change fiber resistance. Based on the present measure-
ments, fire-released fibers have a higher resistance than was
originally reported. Hence, their threat to electrical equipment
is also lower than reported earlier.
These sensors were used to measure the fiber concentrations
and exposures in Dahlgren test #53 and Dugway tests D-l, D-2,
and D-3. In the Dahlgren test, the grid was located 220 m
downstream from the fire and approximately in the center of the
tube. The air velocity in the tube was 0.67 m/s. Figure 2.4-12
shows the measured rates of fibers intercepting the grid, based
on approximately 30-sec. averages, and the calculated fiber con-
centrations in the airflow as a function of time after ignition.
Figure 2.4-13 gives a computed cumulative count and exposure at
this location, based on the rates indicated in figure 2.4-12.
Figures 2.4-14 through 2.4-19 provide similar data for Dugway
test D-l, grid 2, Dugway test D-2, grids 6 and 8, and Dugway test
D-3, grids 4 and 6. The rates shown in these tests were based on
approximately 1-minute averages. The location of the grids on
the ladder is shown in figure 2.4-20. All grids were active.
Data are presented herein on grids which accumulated significant
counts. The air velocities and directions used in the calculation
of concentration and exposure were as follows; test D-I - 6.4 m/s
at 360°, test D-2 - 5.8 m/s at 289°, and test D-3 - 5.3 m/s at
326°. The fiber concentration (C) and exposure (E) were determined
as follows:
N and E = NC = A FV COS @ A FV COS @
g a g a
where N is the total fiber count, N is the rate of fibers inter-
cepting the grid, A is the area of the grid, F is the grid ef-g
ficiency factor, Va is the air velocity and 0 is the wind direction
relative to the grid. Due to the dimensions of the grids, the
concentrations and exposures indicated are for fibers approximately
2 mm and greater in length.
Figure 2.4-6b illustrates a currently unexplained phenomenon
which caused the voltage on the grid to drop partially and to
recharge with very little current. Experimentation indicated
that this was the result of a momentary high-resistance (i.e.,
i00 k_) shunt on the grid. A similar phenomenon occurred in the
Dahlgren fire tests, including #54 with no carbon fiber in the
composite, but did not occur in the chamber tests involving virgin
cut fibers. However, similar results were obtained in laboratory
tests using burned fibers containing some unusually high-resistance
fibers.
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TABLE 2.4-1 WIRE GRID CALIBRATION DATA
a. Static Calibration at Position i.
Numbers of Fibers
Counted on Expected Counted on
Veil Grid Counts Grid Efficiency
Run Nv N$ Ng F
1 50 2303 853 0.37
2 12 553 403 0.73
3 57 2626 1895 0.72
4 56 2580 1927 0.75
Totals 175 8062 5078 0.63
125" 5759* 4225* 0.73*
*Excluding Run 1 because result appeared spurious.
b. Chamber Uniformity Calibration
Position 1 Position 2 Position 3
Run Nv(1) Nv (2) Nv (3)
1 66 75 84
2 41 iii 98
3 39 102 84
4 97 327 281
Totals 243 615 547 1405
1405F = - 1.93
c 3(243)
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TABLE 2.4-i Continued
c. Dynamic Calibration of Grid
Max.
Velocity (static) (dynamic)
8 (m/s) Run Ng Ng Fv
3.14 4.06 1 628 394
2 212 209
3 386 419
Totals 1226 1022 0.81
2.40 3.24 1 503 259
2 514 448
3 297 278
Totals 1314 985 0.96
1.99 2.73 1 204 322
2 623 195
3 511 343
4 334 130
Totals 1672 1040 0.96
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Figure 2.4-1 - Wire grid used in Dahlgren tests
Figure 2.4-2 Wire grid sensor used in Dugway test:;s
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Figure 2.4-11 - Measured and predicted resistances of 2-mm-long fibers
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Figure 2.4-12 - Fiber concentration in Dahlgren test #53
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Figure 2.4-13 - Fiber exposure in Dahlgren test #53
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Figure 2.4-14 - Fiber concentration in Dugway test D-l, grid 2
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Figure 2.4-15 - Fiber exposure in Dugway test D-I, grid 2
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Figure 2.4-16 - Fiber concentration in Dugway test D-2
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Figure 2.4-17 - Fiber exposure in Dugway test D-2
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Figure 2.4-18 - Fiber concentration in Dugway test D-3
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Figure 2.4-19 - Fiber exposure in Dugway test D-3
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Section 3
FIBER RESISTANCE EFFECTS ON ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT VULNERABILITY
Tests using a fiber simulator probe (ref. 3-1), were conducted
on a number of electronic devices to determine the effect of fiber
resistance on the vulnerability of the equipment to damage by car-
bon fibers and, in particular, to assess their vulnerability to
damage by Thornel 300 fibers, which is commonly used in aircraft
structural composites. The testing consisted of bridging across
adjacent circuit nodes with shunts that simulated each of four
fiber resistance levels. After making appropriate resistance cor-
rections for variations in gap distances between nodes, the re-
lationship between fiber resistance and numbers of malfunctions
occurring in a device was determined. The fiber simulator probe
used in the testing simulated the combined effect of fiber contact
and bulk resistances. The resistance was adjustable to simulate
different types and lengths of carbon fibers. The fiber simulator
provided fiber burnout simulation when a predetermined voltage
level for each resistance level was exceeded.
A stereo power amplifier, a television receiver, a micro-
computer and several smoke detectors were tested. Except for the
smoke detectors, the devices had previously been subjected to
carbon fiber exposure tests by the Ballistics Research Laboratory
(ref. 3-2). The devices were selected for testing because they
were considered representative of generic equipment types. The
probe tests are discussed in the following sections.
3.1 STEREO POWER AMPLIFIER
The amplifier was a two-channel fan-cooled audio power ampli-
fier employing silicon semiconductors and conventional printed
circuit boards. Figure 3.1-1 is a photograph of the device.
A number of these units were also used in the exposure tests
covered in section 4.
The amplifier was energized for the tests and provided with
a sinusoidal input signal of 1.6 volts at 1 kHz. The output of
each of the channels of the amplifier was fed to a 100-watt light
bulb. An oscilloscope was used to monitor the output voltages of
each channel. Malfunction was considered to have occurred if the
output voltage changed by more than 40% from nominal output.
The amplifier was probed with resistances of 10k, 3k, ik and
0.4k ohms. The only area which caused amplifier malfunctions when
probed was the printed circuit board, figure 3.1-2. The printed
circuit board for each of the two identical channels of the ampli-
fier contained 181 nodes. Each node in one of the channels was
shunted to an adjacent node or circuit trace. The number of mal-
functions occurring at the various resistance levels are tabulated
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below.
Simulated fiber resistance, 10k 3k ik 0.4k
ohms
Number of shunted node pairs 19 36 51 54
causing malfunctions
The data were plotted on semi-log graph paper as the number
of shunted node pairs causing malfunction versus shunt resistance,
as shown in figure 3.1-3.
For reference, the effective resistance of several materials
was calculated. In figure 3.1-3, the labeled horizontal lines
show the resistance of the indicated material over the range of
fiber length of 3 mm and 7 mm. This range was characteristic of
the spacing between nodes or between nodes and circuit traces
for this amplifier. The range of resistance for each material is
shown on the resistance axis. For multiple fibers bridging a gap
in parallel, the minimum and maximum resistance for each material
may be divided by the number of fibers to predict the expected
number of malfunctions. Table 3.1-1 gives these results in tabu-
lar form for single and double fibers.
The results of the fiber simulator probe tests were compared
with the results of carbon fiber exposure tests conducted by the
Ballistics Research Laboratory using Thornel 300 fibers (ref. 3-2)
and with carbon fiber exposure tests using DG-II4 fibers. The
DG-II4 tests were conducted by the Bionetics Corporation for this
comparison in the NASA carbon fiber exposure test facility (ref.
3-1). Critical exposure levels for 3-mm fiber lengths were
2.5 x 106 fiber seconds/meter3 for the low resistance T-300 fiber
and 2.48 × 107 fiber seconds/meter3 for the high resistance DG-II4
fibers. The carbon fiber exposure tests therefore confirm the
effect indicated by the carbon fiber simulator tests, i.e., the
power amplifier is more vulnerable by approximately an order of
magnitude to the T-300 fibers than to the DG-II4 fibers. This
ratio is consistent with the ratio of the number of shunts causing
malfunction indicated on figure 3.1-3.
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TABLE 3.1-1 POWER AMPLIFIER MALFUNCTIONS CAUSED BY SIMULATED
CARBON FIBERS 3 TO 7 MM LONG
Number of Shunts
Simulated Carbon Causing Malfunctions
Fiber Material
Sin@le-Fiber Shunts Double.Fiber Shunts
4104 54-55 55
HMS 44-53 52-54
GY-70 41-52 50-54
T-300 30-42 40-51
DG-II2 17-29 27-39
DG-II4 0-7 5-17
DG-II0 0 0-4
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Figure 3.1-1 - Stereo power amplifier, cover removed
Figure 3.1-2 - Stereo power amplifier circuit board
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Figure 3.1-3 - Amplifier sensitivity to shunting resistance
3.2 MICROCOMPUTER
A digital computer incorporating microprocessor technology
was tested using the fiber simulator probe. Figure 3.2-1 is a
photograph of the microcomputer circuit board and keyboard. The
following describes elements of the computer.
MPS 6502 Microprocessor Array - This microprocessor is a 40-
pin device which contains n-channel, silicon-gate, depletion-type
MOSFET's. It is the heart of the microcomputer and incorporates
an on-the-chip oscillator and clock driver and provides signals to
and connections for an 8-bit bidirectional data bus, a 16-bit ad-
dress bus, two interrupts and a sync signal.
MPS 6530 Peripheral Interface Adapters (PIA) - The microcom-
puter utilizes two PIA's. These are 40-pin devices which utilize
the same MOSFET technology as the MPS 6502. Each of the PIA's
provides the system with an 8-bit bidirectional connection for
direct interface from the microprocessor to the peripherals, and
10 bits of the address bus for access to the microprocessor and
memory. Each PIA also contains a 1024 x 8 read-only memory (ROM)
and a 64 x 8 random access memory (RAM). The ROM's contain the
monitor and executive programs.
IK Random Access Memory (RAM) - An additional RAM is used
which is comprised of an array of eight 1024 x 1 n-channel, sili-
con-gate depletion-type MOSFET memory devices. This RAM supplies
data and program storage and retrieval for application programs.
The microprocessor, the two PIA's, and the eight memory de-
vices are the basic components of this microcomputer system. They
employ the only NMOS-type of devices in the system.
Keyboard and display - The keyboard has 23 keys (16 hexadeci-
mal numbers and 7 control keys) and a slide switch for single-
stepping an application program. Six 7-segment digit displays
are used. During normal operation, four digits indicate the ad-
dress and two digits indicate the data stored at that address.
An interval timer is utilized for the generation of time base
signals. A I-MHz crystal oscillator operates with the oscillator
circuit in the 6502 microprocessor to provide the basic timing
source.
The application software program provides the computer with
program execution instructions. The software program is entered
via the keyboard in hexadecimal numbers. For the fiber-simulator
tests, the microcomputer was programmed to operate as a digital
stopwatch. This program utilizes only about half the microcomputer.
It was chosen for this test to permit correlation of results with
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carbon-fiber exposure tests on the same type of microcomputer _con-
ducted by the Ballistics Research Laboratory (ref. 3-2).
Most of the conductive lines on the microcomputer circuit
board were arranged in groups or buses as shown on figure 3.2-1.
Adjacent conductors in the groups were generally connected to
adjacent pins on devices such as the microprocessor, the two PIA's
or the eight memory devices. Spacing between adjacent pins on the
devices was 1 to 2 mm and was similar to the spacing between ad-
jacent conductors on the circuit board. Spacings between alternate
pins on the devices was 3 to 5 mm.
Fiber-simulator tests - Since the conductor and pin spacings
were approximately the same and since adjacent conductors generally
connected to adjacent pins on the devices, the fiber simulation
tests were conducted by shunting at the pins of the devices.
Tests were made at each of four resistance levels by shunting
adjacent pins and then shunting alternate pins. Since approximately
the same number of malfunctions were caused whether shunting ad-
jacent pins or alternate pins at a given resistance level, no dis-
tinction between adjacent and alternate pin shunting was made in
reporting the data. Also, where pin shunting at one device was
equivalent to pin shunting at another device, such as for many of
the address and data bus pins, only one shunting was counted.
The data from the fiber-simulator tests of the NMOS devices
(the microprocessor, the two PIA's and the eight memory devices)
in which a total of 306 pairs of pins were shunted, are shown in the
following table and are plotted in figure 3.2-2.
Simulated fiber resistance, 3.4k l.lk 0.43k 0.1k
ohms
Number of shunted pin pairs 1 23 31 160
causing malfunctions
Percent of shunted pin pairs .33% 7.5% 10.1% 52.2%
causing malfunctions
Fiber-simulator probe testing was also done on other devices
in the computer. Figure 3.2-3 lists these and the NMOS devices
and shows the pin shunting resistance at or below which malfunc-
tions occurred in the computer. For reference, the Thornel 300
fiber length corresponding to the shunt resistance is shown on
figure 3.2-3 (contact resistance is not included). As can be seen,
few devices would be affected by fibers in the length range (i to
5 mm) required to bridge the pins or conductor gaps. Adding the
effect of contact resistance would reduce the number of devices
vulnerable to Thornel 300 fibers.
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The results of BRL exposure tests using Thornel 300 fibers
(ref. 3-2) indicated that the microcomputer was invulnerable at
exposures up to 108 fiber-seconds/m3. This suggests that contact
resistance raised the effective fiber resistance above a level
where disruptive shunts occur or the fibers were unable to shunt
sensitive devices such as the crystal because of the small contact
area offered by the devices.
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Figure 3.2-1 - Microcomputer ircuit and keyboard
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Figure 3.2-2 - Microcomputer NMOS device sensitivity to shunting
resistance
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Figure 3.2-3 - Microcomputer component sensitivity to shunt resistance
3.3 TELEVISION RECEIVER
The vertical and video modules of a 19" black and white tele-
vision receiver were subjected to fiber-simulator probe tests.
The vertical module provides the vertical deflection signal for
the cathode-ray tube (CRT) in the television receiver. This module
is contained on a printed circuit board having component-pin and
circuit-trace spacings 3 mm or greater. The board is mounted ver-
tically off the main circuit board and is located directly under
the ventilation slots on the back of the television set.
The vertical module was probed with the fiber simulator in-
strument across 47 pairs of nodes. It failed frequently at higher
resistances than would be expected from a Thornel 300 carbon fiber
(greater than 5 k_/cm). The data from this test are shown below
and are plotted on figure 3.3-1.
Simulated fiber resistance, 10k 3.4k l.lk 0.1k
ohms
Number of shunted node pairs 20 23 28 36
causing malfunctions
Percent of shunted node pairs 42.5 48.9 59.6 76.6
causing malfunctions
The video module takes the RF from the tuner and provides the
input for the sound module and the video signal for the CRT. The
module is contained on a printed circuit board with component pin
and circuit trace spacings 3 mm or greater. The module is mounted
vertically off the main circuit board approximately parallel to
and two inches from the vertical module. The video module is
larger than the vertical module; however, part of the video module
is covered by metal plates which shield the RF on the module.
The video module was probed with the fiber-simulator instru-
ment across 34 pairs of nodes. Fewer nodes are accessible on this
board because of the areas covered by the RF shielding. The video
module had fewer failures at the high resistance than did the
vertical module. The data from this test are shown below and are
also plotted on figure 3.3-1.
Simulated fiber resistance, 10k 3.4k l.lk 0.1k
ohms
Number of shunted node pairs 5 ii 18 26
causing malfunctions
Percent of shunted node pairs 14.7 32.3 53 76.5
causing malfunctions
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Almost half of the shunts on the vertical module caused malfunc-
tions at 10K ohms or less resistance whereas only 15 percent of
the shunts on the video module caused malfunctions at this re-
sistance. For the node spacings in this receiver, about 28 node
pairs were sensitive in the vertical module compared to 18 node
pairs on the video module in the resistance range of Thornel 300
fiber.
BRL exposed this complete television receiver to Thornel 300
virgin carbon fibers (ref. 3-2). The vertical module failed six
times out of the nine exposures and the video module failed one
time out of nine exposures. No other failures occurred in the re-
ceiver. The BRL tests confirm the higher likelihood of vertical-
module failures which was indicated by the fiber simulator tests.
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Figure 3.3-1 - Television receiver module sensitivity to shunting
resistance
3.4 SMOKE/FIRE DETECTORS
Several ionization-type smoke detectors were tested with the
fiber simulator. In addition, a photoelectric-type smoke detector
was examined for vulnerability to carbon fibers.
Photoelectric-type smoke detectors contain a light source
that sends a beam of light through a light-tight chamber to a col-
lector. A photocell is positioned to see no light as long as the
air is clean. When smoke enters the sensing chamber, the light
beam is reflected or scattered. Part of the reflected light is
sensed by the photocell which triggers the alarm.
Ionization smoke detectors contain a chamber of ionized air
which conducts a small electric current. The ionization energy
source is usually 2 to 4 microcuries of Americium 241. A voltage
applied across two electrodes in the sensing chamber causes a small
current to flow through the ionized air. When smoke enters the
sensing chamber, the ions attach themselves to the smoke particles
instead of the air particles. The ionized smoke particles move
much more slowly than ionized air particles, decreasing the cur-
rent flowing through the chamber. The decrease in current is
sensed to trigger the alarm.
Although most smoke/fire detectors work by one of these prin-
ciples, each manufacturer provides unique design features.
The arrangement of the electronics in the detectors acquired
for this test program was similar. The components were mounted
on the front side of a printed circuit board with conductive lines
on the back side of the board. Minimum spacings between neighbor-
ing nodes were generally 3 nun. The enclosures of the electronics
depended on the type of detector. The ionization-type of detectors
were essentially open, permitting ready entry for almost any fiber
length. The photoelectric-type of detector was very well sealed
with the electronics in a chamber having a filtered air passage.
The following describes the fiber simulator tests performed
on each detector. Failure of a detector to alarm in the presence
of smoke While indicating an "ON" mode of operation was considered
a failure of the test.
Detector "A" - This was a 9-volt battery-operated smoke and
fire detector that operated on the ionization principle described
previously.
All of the electronics within the detector were mounted on
a single printed circuit board. This board had conductive lines
on the back side and the components on the front side. The com-
ponents were separated with a minimum spacing between any two
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nodes of approximately 4 mm.
The data collected from this test are shown in the following
table. Of 44 pairs of nodes shunted, 8 produced failures for all
values of the shunt resistance.
Simulated fiber resistance, 10k 3.4k l.lk 0.1k
ohms
Number of shunted node pairs 8 8 8 8
causing failure
Percent of shunted node pairs 18.2% 18.2% 18.2% 18.2%
causing failure
Detector "B" - This detector operated on the ionization prin-
ciple and is available in 120-volt ac or 9-volt battery-operated
models. Both models were tested with the fiber simulator.
The battery-operated model was the simpler of the two models.
Only two capacitors were visible on the circuit board. No failures
were recorded with any value of shunting resistance down to i00
ohms.
The 120-volt AC model also had very few components, but more
than the battery operated model. It, too, did not fail in these
tests.
Detector "C" - This was a 9-volt battery-operated smoke and
fire detector that operated on the ionization principle.
The construction of this detector was similar to that of
detector "A". All of the components were mounted on the front
side of a printed circuit board with the conductive lines on the
back side of the circuit board. The minimum spacing between nodes
was approximately 3 mm.
The data collected from this test are shown in the following
table. Of the total of 51 pairs of nodes shunted, only five
caused failure.
Simulated fiber resistance, 10k 3.4k l.lk 0.1k
ohms
Number of shunted node pairs 1 1 4 5
causing failure
Percent of shunted node pairs 2% 2% 7.8% 9.8%
causing failure
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Detector "D" - This was a 120-volt ac operated detector that
operated on the photoelectric principle described previously.
The construction of this smoke detector was somewhat dif-
ferent than for the other detectors tested. Because of the
operating principle, all of the electronics were encased in a
light-tight chamber. When the cover is removed while the detector
is "ON", the alarm sounds and will not stop until the cover is re-
placed. For this reason, this detector could not be tested with
"o the fiber simulator. Nevertheless, special note was taken of its
enclosure.
The electronics were sealed very well with a filter over the
portion in which the air flows. Fibers larger than 2 mm are un-
likely to pass through this filter, and such short fibers would
be unable to shunt any two nodes in the system without coupling
multiple fibers in a single shunt. The minimum spacing between
two nodes was approximately 4 mm. Thus, this unit was regarded
invulnerable, and was not tested.
The shunting resistance at which failures were caused in two
of the four ionization type smoke detectors tested was in the
range of resistance of Thornel 300 fibers (approximately 200 ohms
for 3-to 4-mm fibers).
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Section 4
EFFECTS OF FIRE-RELEASED CARBON FIBERS
ON POWER AMPLIFIERS
As a part of its study of carbon-fiber effects on electrical
and electronic equipment, NASA conducted experiments (ref. 4-2) in
which carbon-fiber composites were deliberately consumed by jet-
fuel fires. The experiments were performed in the shock-tube fa-
cility at the Naval Surface Weapons Center, Dahlgren, Virginia.
The Bionetics Corporation supported this series of experiments by
providing instrumentation that monitored the exposure rates (sec-
tion 2.4 of this report), and by exposingfpower amplifiers to fire-
released fibers in these experiments. Identical amplifiers were
also subjected to virgin carbon-fiber exposure tests (ref. 4-1) and
to fiber-simulator probe tests (section 3.1 of this report). This
section discusses the results of the fire-released fiber tests on
the amplifiers.
4.1 AMPLIFIER DESCRIPTION
The units tested were two-channel fan-cooled power amplifiers
employing silicon semiconductors and conventional printed circuit
boards. Figures 3.1-1 and -2 are photographs of one of the several
identical amplifiers tested. This device was chosen for testing
because it was considered representative of electrical/electronic
equipment having greatest vulnerability to damage by carbon fibers.
This judgment was based primarily on the type of circuitry and the
cooling provisions. The amplifiers employ both unprotected printed
circuitry and unfiltered fan cooling. The amplifier cooling fans
were operated continuously during the tests rather in their normal
thermostat controlled mode to insure maximum internal fiber expo-
sure during tests.
4.2 TEST CONDITIONS
Four tests were conducted in which the power amplifiers were
used. The first and second tests were soot tests in which ampli-
fiers were operated in the smoke environment produced by the prod-
ucts of combustion of JP-I fuel used in small-scale simulations
of aircraft crash fires in the shock tube. Two amplifiers were
tested in the first test and six amplifiers were tested in the
second test. In the third test, carbon-fiber composite material
was burned in the test fire, exposing six amplifiers to the carbon
fiber, the smoke from the burning fuel, and the effluent from the
burning matrix of the composite material. The fourth test exposed
six amplifiers to the effluent from a similar test fire in which
a glass-fiber composite material was burned. The epoxy matrix ma-
terial of the glass-fiber composite was similar to that of the
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carbon-fiber composite material burned in the third test. The
first, second and fourth tests were intended to provide a basis
for isolating the effects on the electronics of the fuel and com-
posite resin products of combustion from the effects of the carbon
fiber released in the third test. A summary of the amplifier test
experience is contained in Table 4-1.
4.3 TESTS AND RESULTS
First soot-exposure test.- Two amplifiers were placed on the
test table in the shock tube approximately 170 m downstream from
a burning pool of JP-I fuel. A fan drew the smoke plume through
the shock tube and over the equipment under test. The fire lasted
for approximately one-and-one-half hours with varying degrees of
soot release and a peak temperature of 322 K at the amplifiers.
Both amplifiers were powered during the exposure and their
outputs were fed to dummy loads drawing about 50% of the rated
power. Both amplifiers operated within test specification through-
out the test.
Sticky paper slides and cylinders from various positions on
the test table and inside the amplifiers were compared using a
light depletion technique. Soot deposition inside the amplifiers
was approximately 70% of deposition outside the amplifiers.
Second soot-exposure test.- Six amplifiers were placed on the
test table and operated as in the first soot test. The temperature
of the airstream near the amplifiers did not exceed 330 K during
the test. During the initial twenty minutes of exposure, the volt-
age of the common oscillator input to the amplifiers dropped 2.8%.
Operation of the amplifiers was continued for 2½ hours (through
fuel burnout and cool down of the facility), during which time the
input oscillator voltage in one amplifier dropped 33% to 1.18 V ac.
Examination indicated a fault in one channel of one of the ampli-
fiers.
The failed unit was analyzed for cause of failure. The mal-
function was traced to the existence of a negative 71 V dc at
the amplifier output and a negative 30.5 V dc at the input with
the amplifier energized and no input signal. Visual inspection of
the channel A circuit board with a magnifying glass revealed no
fiber, soot or other particles which may have caused short circuits.
Voltage checks were then made which indicated that the negative
dc supply voltage existed throughout the board. Based on voltage
drops, the second differential amplifier was indicated as a problem
area. A transistor from the second differential amplifier was re-
placed as were four resistors which had appeared bad in the visual
check. After these replacements, the negative dc supply voltage
disappeared from the output and input. However, positive dc supply
voltage appeared at both output and input.
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The board was again checked for voltage levels at pin and node
locations. The positive supply voltage appeared to be shorted to
the signal path. The board was taken out, cleaned, and brushed.
The problem still remained, so the positive voltage line was broken
in order to isolate the problem. This left the problem to three
components which were removed, but each was found to be in good
condition.
The board was then checked with a magnifying glass for parti-
cles that could be causing the short. A thin, wirelike piece of
metal was found between the collector and base of a transistor.
This was removed,correcting the shorting problem, but there was still
a small amount of dc voltage on the output. A diode was then found
to be shorted. The diode was replaced to correct the problem. The
amplifier now performed within specification.
The failure probably resulted from part(s) failure and was
probably unrelated to the exposure in the shock tube environment.
Soot is unlikely to have caused the malfunction because soot
has generally been found to be nonconductive in the voltage ranges
which exist in the amplifier system. Visual inspection did not
reveal any short-circuit paths attributable to soot.
Carbon fibers may have caused the failure. Although the shock
tube was washed down prior to the test, a few residual carbon fi-
bers from prior testing may have been present during this test.
However, the visual microscope inspection gave no indication of a
fiber short circuit.
The wirelike piece of metal, which was found during the
tracing of the later, positive voltage problem, was basic to that
problem but probably not to the original problem. The metal was
not found in the original microscope inspection. Also, the nature
of the problem created by the wirelike metal was unlike the original
problem. The piece of metal was probably introduced accidentally
during removal and replacement of parts.
Fire-released carbon-fiber exposure test (test no. 53, ref.
4-2).- Six ampl1_lers were exposed in thls test tO the products
of combustion of both fuel and carbon-fiber composite material.
The duration of the fire was 3½ hours and i0 kg of carbon-fiber
composite material were burned in the fire. The amplifiers were
mounted approximately eight feet above the mounting elevation used
in the soot tests in order to locate the amplifiers in a region
of maximum fiber concentration in the shock tube. The ambient
temperature during the test was 302 K in the region of the ampli-
fiers. The test set-up and test observation data follow:
The amplifiers were fed by a 0.64-Vrms, l-kHz input signal
from a i0:i attenuating buffer device driven by a 6.4-V rms, l-kHz
79
oscillator. Each of the amplifiers was loaded with two 100-watt
light bulbs, one for each channel. A nominal 30-V rms, l-kHz out-
put signal was obtained from each amplifier channel. Each ampli-
fier channel was monitored by a sensing device which activated an
LED display for output voltage changes in excess of 30% of the
nominal output. The outputs were also monitored by an oscilloscope
and digital multi-meter to indicate deviations in output voltages.
Test observations are contained in Table 4-1. All amplifier
channels had failed permanently after 57 minutes of exposure. A few
malfunctioned or failed after only i0 minutes of exposure. Some-
times a particular channel revived one or more times after mal-
functioning or failing to produce a signal.
The amplifiers were returned to NASA Langley Research Center
after the test and were cleaned inside and out by vacuum cleaning.
They were then performance checked, using the same equipment and
setup used at Dahlgren. All channels performed out of specifi-
cation limits. The systems and frequency of occurrence of each
were:
Malfunction No. of channels
Positive 7.2 Vrms on output 1
Negative 56-72 V dc on output 7
No output 3
ac ripple on output 6
Low output 1
The amplifiers were repaired and returned to specification
level operating condition. No specific pattern of failure was
found. However, replacement of several parts was generally re-
quired to return the units to operating condition. Replacement
parts included fuses, resistors, condensors, diodes and transistors.
Soot/epoxy-matrix exposure test (test no. 54, ref. 4-2).- Six
amplifiers were exposed to conditions essentially identical to
those in the previous carbon-fiber exposure test except that rather
than burning carbon fiber composite material, fiberglass composite
material was burned which contained the same type and quantity of
matrix as was present in the carbon-fiber test. The test set up,
including monitoring instrumentation was identical to that used
for the fire-released carbon-fiber-exposure test.
Two amplifier channels were inoperative prior toand during
the test. The remaining i0 channels operated within specification
limits throughout the test. The output voltage deviated gradually
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from nominal for the ten operational channels during the test.
The final average deviation, after 200 minutes of test, was 6.2%.
4.4 CONCLUSIONS
The stereo power amplifiers tested had a low-to-negligible
vulnerability to damage by soot released by burning JP-I aircraft
fuel and to soot plus the residue from burning epoxy resins such
as used as matrix for structural composite materials. However, the
amplifiers were vulnerable to damage by carbon fibers released
from burning carbon fiber composite material. The exposure levels
that caused these amplifiers to malfunction or fail are reported
in reference 4-2.
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TABLE 4-1 - RESULTS OF FIRE-RELEASED CARBON-FIBER EXPOSURE TEST
Amplifier output, volts
Amplifier No. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Channel R L i R I L i R L i R I L i R L R L
Test time, minutes II I'_ _J _! _'
0 (ignition) /* ,I/ i / V' i / / IfV' / / V' / /
_ I L !
i0 / / i / I V' i / 0 ! V' 0 39 39 V' 0J
15 / V' / / i / 0 / 0 0 / 3 3
20 / I i! ,i / V'E V' o / o o / V' o
J
25 / I V' V' / J v' 0 _/' 0 0 / v' 0
I i
30 / V' / 3 't v' o o o o o / o
35 / i v' / / ! 0 0 0 0 0 0 i/ 3
i40 ,/ 0 V' V' , 0 0 0 0 0 0 V' 3
i ,-
45 / 0 / V' _ 0 0 0 0 0 0 / 3
50 / I 0 0 / ' V' 0 0 0 0 0 ,I /
55 V' 0 0 5 i / 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
57 0 0 0 8 I 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I I
l65 / 0 0 7 i 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
70 / I 0 0 6 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
: i 2 I
75 0 ,J 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I i
zoo o i o I o o o o o o o o o o
130 All channels inoperative - turned all amplifiers off
200 Turned all amplifiers on
205 All channels inoperative - turned all amplifiers off
Indicates output voltage within specification limits of 30 + 9 volts (rms).
Section 5
POST-EXPOSURE FAILURE OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
Most of the testing of equipment to determine vulnerability
to graphite fiber was concerned with only those failures that oc-
curred during or immediately following an exposure. As soon as a
test was completed, the test item was cleaned, thus removing any
trapped fibers. In an accidental exposure, equipment may not be
cleaned thoroughly for years. Thus, trapped fibers could remain
dormant in the device, but be dislodged by normal handling, be
redisseminated in the chassis and possibly cause future problems.
To provide data on this problem, a series of tests were performed
in the Langley Research Center carbon-fiber test facility (ref.
5-1).
To simulate long-term use, previously exposed electrical units
were subjected to gentle airflow, mechanical jostling and electro-
static forces to induce fiber dissemination. The airflow was
produced by a small fan and was intended to simulate the air veloc-
ities which are typical of a household fan. The mechanical jostling
consisted of sliding the unit back and forth across a table for a
distance of about one-third meter, lifting the unit, and then re-
placing it on the table. The sequence of events for each cycle
was:
i. Expose to E = 105 f.s/m3, in the O__Nor OFF condition.
2. Turn ON if exposed OFF
3. After 2-minute wait, turn OFF
4. Simulate fan-forced airflow
5. After 2-minute wait, jostle device by moving to new
tabletop position.
6. Turn ON and repeat cycle 49 times, starting at step 3.
If no failures occurred within fifty such sequences the de-
vice was judged to be immune to the fibers trapped inside. Fifty
cycles were chosen as the appropriate number by the following
reasoning. Each time fibers are redisseminated, some of them
will become permanently trapped. Even if the number trapped is
small, say 5%, after fifty redisseminations over 90% of the fibers
will be permanently trapped. Thus, further testing would be fruit-
less.
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Two items were chosen for these tests. They were:
i. 19" color TV
2. Stereo power amplifier.
Identical amplifiers were subjected to simulated fiber-probe
tests (section 3.1 of this report), virgin-fiber exposure tests
(ref. 5-2) and fire-released-fiber exposure tests (section 4 of
this report.
The test items were exposed to Thornel 300 fibers 4, 8 and
12 mm long in both the "ON" and "OFF" condition. Three replicate
tests were conducted for each length and condition. Thus, eighteen
tests were conducted on each device. The exposure level of each
was approximately 105 fiber sec/m3, an exposure higher than would
be expected for household interiors from aircraft accidents of
large size and close proximity. The results of these tests are
shown in table 5-1.
The amplifier failed three times at the exposure levels in-
dicated in the table. The exposures that caused these failures
are consistent with previous test results under the same conditions
(ref. 5-2). No post-exposure failures occurred for either device.
This indicates that the problem is small for similar household
electronics such as televisions, amplifiers and radios.
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TABLE 5-1 POST-EXPOSURE TEST DATA,
COLOR TV AND STEREO POWER AMPLIFIER
!
Condition
Fiber Exposure, during Exposure Post-exposure
length, mm f.s/m3 exposure failures failures
4 4 × 105 On None None
4 3 x 105 On None None
4 2 × 105 On None None
4 3 x 105 Off None None
4 4 x 105 Off None None
4 2 × 106 Off None None
8 2 x 105 On None None
8 2 x 105 On Amplifier None*
8 2 x 105 On None None
8 1 x 105 Off None None
8 4 x 105 Off None None
8 4 × 105 Off None None
12 4 x 105 On None None
12 2 x 105 On Amplifier None*
12 2 x 105 On Amplifier None*
12 3 x 105 Off None None
12 1 x 106 Off None None
12 1 x 106 Off None None
*Only the TV was post-exposure tested. The amplifier failed during
exposure and therefore was not post-exposure tested.
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Section 6
VULNERABILITY OF GENERAL AVIATION AVIONICS EQUIPMENT
General aviation avionics equipment was evaluated for its
vulnerability to damage from carbon fibers. General aviation en-
compasses all civil flying except that of the certified scheduled
airlines. 99% of all the civil aircraft, 95% of the pilots, 84%
of the total hours, even 43% of all instrument approaches are
associated with general aviation (ref. 6-1).
Various prior surveys of general aviation owner characteristics
(refs. 6-1 and 6-2), and avionics (ref. 6-3) were examined. A
unique characteristic of these airplanes is that they are rarely
discarded. On occasion, aircraft are cannibalized to maintain
other machines. A considerable number of old aircraft are restored
each year. Accidents, principally those involving older aircraft,
are the primary cause of attrition. Of all registered aircraft,
56% are over i0 years old. Reference 6-2 estimates that 80% of
all aircraft in use today are likely to be flying in the year 2000.
As a part of the study, visits were made to airports, main-
tenance facilities and avionics manufacturing plants to determine
generic characteristics of widely used equipment. Equipment was
selected for testing to bound the variety of construction and
operating techniques. The selected equipment was tested at the
Ballistics Research Laboratory (ref. 6-4) and at the NASA Langley
Research Center in the carbon fiber test chamber described in
reference 6-5.
Current avionics characteristics.- The spectrum of avionics
equipment ranges from single-tube radios to complex area navigation
(RNAV) inertial equipment superior to that used by the airlines.
Visits to active aircraft indicated a substantial quantity
of tube-type equipment was still in use. However, current pro-
duction airplanes and most existing aircraft use transistorized
equipment. The current general aviation avionic gear is dif-
ferentiated from that used by airlines by being smaller, by gen-
erating less transmitted power, by frequently using less-durable
components, by having broader tolerances for the same function and
by having fewer features. Also important, is the fact that general
aviation avionics packages are not physically, and only barely
functionally interchangeable, so that almost every feature is
varied by all the manufacturers.
One avionics manufacturer coats all the circuit boards during
and after assembly, rendering the components on the boards relatively
invulnerable. Another manufacturer uses uncoated boards with the
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components internally cooled by forced airflow. The features of
most other equipment fall somewhere between these extremes. One
justification for post-coating a circuit board is to protect it
against possible exposure to moisture. Thus, a producer may not
coat boards for equipment that is panel mounted but will coat
boards for equipment mounted in landing gear bays where exposure
to moisture is a direct cause of concern. Because of the present
effort to provide a great deal of capability through digital tech-
nology in a very small volume, cooling is a very critical problem.
Many manufacturers incorporate forced-air cooling to cool their
own equipment, rather than depend on the air supplied by the air-
frame manufacturer. None of the blower-cooled equipment obtained
for the test program was equipped with filters.
Avionics component tests.- As part of the NASA carbon fiber
study, the United States Army Ballistic Research Laboratory at
the Aberdeen Proving Ground exposed a number of general aviation
avionics components to carbon fibers. Table 6-1_is a summary of
the equipment tested and the average exposure, E, required to cause
malfunction. Failures were noted on all the equipment except for
the Distance Measuring Equipment, (DME) and the Combination Navi-
gation-Communications Equipment, (NAV/COM), but at such high ex-
posure rates that the equipment must be considered invulnerable
in realistic environments.
Two units currently manufactured and sold in relatively large
volume were selected for testing at the NASA Langley Research
Center. One was a very commonly used NAV/COM combination of com-
munication transceiver and very-high frequency omni-range (VOR)
navigation receiver with a separate VOR course-deviation indicator.
This unit was selected because of its wide use and because of the
way it was cooled. Cooling air is pumped into the back of the
unit at about 0.001 m3/sec, passed over horizontally layered
boards, across the back of the front-panel indicator lamps and out
the sides at the front end. A second unit was a remote mounted
DME and its panel-mounted indicator. This unit is dependent on the
VOR frequency selector in the NAV/COM unit. The remote part of
this DME was covered with a coarse filter which might readily ad-
mit carbon fibers. This DME was a precision digital instrument.
The tests were conducted by Bionetics in the NASA carbon
fiber test chamber. The test procedures and the exposure data
collection and analysis were identical to those described in ref-
erence 6-6 for commercial aviation avionics.
The avionics devices were subjected to acoustic, maneuver
and shock environments at intervals during the carbon fiber
exposure test sequence. These environments were intended to
simulate the flight operational environments which could affect
fiber dissemination within the devices. The simulated flight ma-
neuver and landing shock environments consisted of manual
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movement of the devices six inches front to rear four times, then
repeating the movement four times in a side to side direction and
finally repeating the movement up and down. This movement produced
accelerations of .5 to .8 g's. After this movement, the devices
were subjected to i00 decibels of pink noise for five minutes to
simulate the flight acoustic environment. A shaper, amplifier
and mixer were set for a flat response from 40 Hz to 1000 Hz.
The sound level was established based on measured noise levels in
avionics bays of commercial transport aircraft. This level is
above that normally experienced in general aviation aircraft.
The test logic for the devices is shown in figure 6-1. After
turning the test device "on" it was exposed to 3 x 107 fiber-
seconds/meter3 (f.s/m3) of selected length fibers and then to an
application of the simulated flight environment (FE). The fiber
and acoustic exposures were applied a third time unless failure
occurred earlier. If no failures occurred before completion of
the third exposure, the test unit was declared invulnerable.
If an item failed during this procedure, a more detailed
procedure, as outlined in figure 6-1, was followed to quantify the
exposure levels at which failures occurred. Exposure to fibers
advanced stepwise in increments of (/TO) times each earlier step.
After each such increment, the unit was subjected to acoustic and
mechanical accelerations and was checked to see whether failure
had occurred. Each instrument was subjected to this sequence four
times to establish average values of exposure to failure.
The functions monitored for failure in the tests were:
NAV/COM DME
Course deviation indicator (CDI) Distance
needle deflection
"To-from" indicator Velocity
Flags Transmitter power
The communications transceiver was tested by listening to
local airport traffic. A transmission radio check was conducted
before and after the acoustic and shock tests.
The results from the exposure tests are indicated in table
6-2. The very-high-frequency omni-range VOR, course-deviation
indicator and the DME control and display units were not tested
because these items were well sealed and presented no potential
problems.
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Seven failures were encountered. The four DME failures all
occurred at exceptionally high exposure levels, similar to those
reported for the DME in reference 6-1. None of the failures oc-
curred during exposure. All occurred after post exposure shock
or acoustics environments. The communications systems failed
first at very high exposure (E = 9 x 107 fiber-sec/m3) to l-mm-
long fibers. The failure was "poor reception". The unit was
cleaned and checked to no avail. It was returned to the manu-
facturers, who could find no fault. When it was retested at NASA,
the unit performed satisfactorily. The subsequent two failures
occurred at high exposures (i × 107 and 1.8 x 107 fiber-sec/m3)
to 10-mm-long fibers. Examination of the unit showed that the
circuit boards were stacked as parallel planes somewhat less than
10 mm apart. The offending fibers bridged gaps between the boards.
Such fibers were easily removed by vacuum cleaning. One failure was
traced directly to the 10-mm fibers getting into the relatively
open volume and squelch control pots. These pots had to be re-
placed to restore the equipment to operating condition.
Although this assortment of failures was observed, the ex-
posures and fiber lengths required to cause them were orders
of magnitude higher than exposures expected from aircraft fires.
Thus, the general aviation avionics equipment tested was judged
to be essentially invulnerable to accidentally released carbon
fibers.
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TABLE 6-1
RESULTS OF CARBON-FIBER EXPOSURE TESTS AT BRL
Fiber No. No. Average
Equipment length, of of exposure,
mm tests failures f.s/m3
Communications 3.5 6 1 108
(from 4 different 3.5 5 2 108
manufacturers)
3.5 7 4 108
3.5 7 3 108
NAV/COM (a) 3.5 4 0 108
DME (b) 1 2 0 6 x 107
3.5 3 0 6 x 107
7 2 0 6 × 107
Transponder 3.5 12 3 108
87 12 2 i0
815 12 1 10
a) Navigation Receiver and Communications Transceiver Pack-
ages.
b) Distance Measuring Equipment.
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TABLE 6-2
RESULTS OF CARBON-FIBER EXPOSURE TESTS AT NASA
Exposure,
Fiber
lenqth f.s/m3 NAV/COM DME
71 mm 9 × 10 Failure after Failure after
vibration vibration
3 mm 6 × 107 No failure Failure after
vibration
9 x 107 No failure Failure after
vibration
6 × 107 No failure No failure
i0 mm 1 x 107 Failure No failure
9 x 107 No failure Failure after
acoustic exposure
1.8 × 107 Failure No failure
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Gross
Vulnerability Test Quantitative
Vulnerability Test
Expose to 3 Clean Expose to 3 I
3 x 107 f.s/m , and 1 × 105 f s/m , I_ Repeat (4 runs)
add FE Repair _ add FE, I
check function |
!
Failed _ Failed I Clean and I
_- repair
Not Not
failed failedI'
Repeat
exposure(2 runs)
Expose at higher
Failed fiber levels in
_- /_ steps, add FE,
check function
Not
failed
[I Declare - __
Failed
nvulne able
Figure 6-1 - Avionics Test Logic
Section 7
ATTENUATION EFFECTS OF CARBON FIBERS ON AIRCRAFT LANDING AIDS
The possible degradation in performance of instrument landing
systems by carbon fibers released from a fire involving carbon
fiber composite material was evaluated analytically. This analysis
considered only the attenuation of electromagnetic energy in the
transmission through a radome with carbon fiber deposits on it,
or through a cloud of airborne carbon fibers. The basis of the
study is the theoretical formulation of the absorption and scat-
tering cross section of resistive cylinders given by Renau (ref.
7-1). These formulations are valid only when the cylinder is
short relative to a half wavelength of the radiated energy. For
cylinders with large length-to-diameter ratios (£/d), the mean
(over all incidence angles) absorption and scattering cross sec-
tions (oa and Os respectively) from Renau may be written in the
following form:
If £/d >> 1
_a = v
(1)
1 +
OS = \24_/\r (2)
1 +
where e is the frequency, _v and ZO are the permeability and char-
acteristic impedance of free space and V and r are the volume and
bulk resistivity of the cylinder. The constant e° is a function
of the length-to-diameter ratio, £/d, and resistivity, r, of the
cylinder as follows :
1 d 2
where _v is the permittivity of free space. Figure 7-1 shows the
absorption and scattering cross sections of cylinders with dimen-
sions and resistivity typical of fire-released carbon fibers. It
can be seen that the scattering cross section is at least 3 orders
of magnitude smaller than the absorption cross section for the
frequencies of interest.
To determine the attenuation of a plane wave passing through
a plane surface, such as a radome, with a uniform deposition, D,
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of carbon fibers, the power density of the field exiting from the
surface, Pl' relative to the power density incident on the surface,
Po' is
Pl = Po (l-D_a-D_s)
Pl
- I-D (Oa + Os)
Po
As can be seen from figure i, Os is much smaller than Oa and may
be neglected, resulting in an attenuation/As, in db as follows:
As = I0 log (I-Doa) (4)
To determine the attenuation of a plane wave (ideal) prop-
agating through a volume with a uniform concentration, C, of fi-
bers, it is necessary to consider the reduction in field power
density occurring as each fiber is intercepted. Assuming the
power density, after intercepting a fiber, is uniformly reduced
over a unit area, and again neglecting S t
Pl = Po (l-Oa)
where Po is the power density prior to, and Pl is the power density
after, intercepting the first fiber. The power density (pn) after
intercepting n fibers is
n
Pn = Po (l-_a)
The attenuation, A , in db isv
Av = i0 n log (i-_a)
Since the number of fibers intercepted in a unit volume is the
fiber concentration, C, the attenuation per unit path length is,
Av = i0 C log (i-_a) (5)
Approximation of the attenuations, As and AV, relating them
to the mass of carbon fiber material, Mf, follow:
As 10 log l- s o= 3pr
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F(_)
Mf Z°
Av = i0 C log i- 3pr
1
-
Mf
V _ _
P
Ms = D Mf
Mv = C Mf
where o is the density of carbon fiber, Mf is the mass of a single
fiber, Ms is the mass of carbon fiber per unit surface area and
M is the mass of carbon fiber per unit volume in a cloud. Forv
carbon fiber,
p = i.8 Mg/m3
-5
r = 2.10 _ m
Z F(e)
o < 3 5 m2/g3or
If the mass of carbon fiber deposited per square meter, Ms, and
the mass of a single fiber is limited, a further simplification
of equations (4) and (5) follows.
If Ms _<102 mg/m2 and Mf _<102 mg
M Z F (_) [ Z F (_) Ms
i- s o _ [i o3pr -- 3pr
F (e) [ Z F (e) Mf
Mf Z° _ [i oi- 3or -- 3pr
z F(e)]As - i0 log 1 o (6)Ms 3pr
A [ Z F(_)
v = i0 log L1 o (7)IM-- 3pr
v
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Equations (6) and (7) provide a good estimate of the attenuation
of carbon fiber as a function of the length-to-diameter ratio
and the mass of material. These normalized attenuation factors
are shown in figure 7-2.
Table 7-1 is a summary of the maximum levels of attenuation
that can be expected at the upper I.L.S. and M.L.S. frequencies.
These numbers were derived assuming a single fiber mass of 2.10-4
mg, maximum concentrations of 103 fibers/m3 and maximum depositions
of 104 fibers/m2. At these levels, the individual fiber spacing
should be such that no significant electrical coupling between
fibers exists. Attenuation values are given for length-to-diameter
ratios of up to 1000 as an upper value even though these ratios
are unlikely. The attenuation appears to be negligible except
in the MLS case with a fiber length-to-diameter ratio of 1000. In
this case, if the fiber cloud (fire plume) is oriented directly
along the transmission path to an approaching aircraft and is
several kilometers long, the attenuation may be enough to reduce
the operating range by 30%, however no bias errors would result.
Reference
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TABLE 7-1 - SUMMARY OF MAXIMUM ESTIMATED ATTENUATION
FOR I.L.S. AND M.L.S. NAVIGATION AIDS
Path Atten.
per Km Radome Atten.
(i/d) (C = 103 f/m3) (D = 104 f/m2)
I.L.S. (300 MHz) 200 2 x 10-5 db 2 x 10-6 db
1000 6 × 10-3 db 6 × 10-4 db
-3 -4
M.L.S. (5 GHz) 200 6 × 10 db 6 x i0 db
i000 1 db 1 × i0-I db
£/d
_we'-(5000)I°-5 - --(2ooi
_ _(IOOO1
! _ __ _(5ooo)
lO-lO ,- __...__ _ ----_ _ _" "'_K,_(1000)
L _ _ _ _ (40)
__200)_ _ --
-'_ _ _ I I _..4--- (401
EFFECTIVE 10_15 _ I _CROSS-SECTIONm2 - _. _ _ I _ .v
I U
10-20 - a
I -S10-25 I I I I I I III I I , i I i Ill
108 109 I0 I0
FREQUENCY,Hz
Figure 7-1 Absorption and scattering cross-sections of a single
carbon fiber for various lenath-to-diameter ratios
volume = l0-I_ m31 bulk resistivity =(assumes fiber
2x10-5 nm, fiber length .<KX/2)
£/d 5000
10-2
10-3
10-4
10-5
SURFACEATTENUATION,
db 10-6
mg per square meter
10-7
PATHATTENUATION, 10-8
db per meter
mg per cubic meter 10-9 _ 40
o LK
I0_i0 RESlSTIVlTY: 2xlO-5 _m
i0 -II LENGTH<<X/2
10_12 I I I I I II II I I I I IIIII
108 109 i0 I0
FREQUENCY,Hz
Figure 7-2 Normalized attenuation factors for various
length-to-diameter ratios
Section 8
VULNERABILITY SURVEYS OF INDUSTRIAL
FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT
A major consideration in assessing the economic impact re-
sulting from the release of carbon fibers from crash-fire accidents
of civil aircraft was the effect of the fibers on industrial, com-
mercial and public facilities. Evaluation of the economic impact
of facility exposure required estimates of the vulnerability of
equipment and effectiveness of filters in restricting the passage
of carbon fibers. Vulnerability estimates were based on the re-
sults of exposure tests reported in reference 8-1. In addition,
Bionetics performed qualitative evaluations of the vulnerability
of industrial control elements and of the effectiveness of elec-
trical equipment enclosures in restricting the passage of carbon
fibers. Carbon fiber transmission tests of industrial filters
were performed by Bionetics and the Ballistics Research Laboratory.
Correlations between ASHRAE established dust spot efficiency ratings
and carbon fiber transmission were made by Bioneticslbased on the
test results.
Four industrial facilities were selected for surveys by a
NASA-Bionetics Corporation technical team to gather data required
for economic impact studies. Analysis of the data provided esti-
mates of the equipment failure and cost effects of several levels
of carbon fiber exposure. The results of these surveys and anal-
yses were combined with the results of approximately 60 surveys
and analyses performed by Bionetics and other participants in the
carbon fiber risk assessment program to provide the basic data
for the national economic impact estimates.
These subjects are discussed in the following sections.
8.1 TRANSFER FUNCTION ASSESSMENT
Transfer functions play a prominent role in establishing the
likelihood of failures of specific items of equipment and the
potential cost risks accompanying such failures. To establish
the appropriate transfer function for potentially vulnerable equip-
ment items, each manufacturing facility was inspected to determine
the wiring standards employed, the effectiveness of filters in-
cluded in the plant ventilation systems and in the enclosures for
each item of electrical or electronic equipment that might be
vulnerable.
Many electrical and electronic components are enclosed in
standardized boxes for a variety of reasons, ranging from assuring
that personnel do not contact live circuits accidentally to assuring
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that circuitry is not adversely affected even when the electrical
device is submerged or subjected to sprays, explosive gases or
contaminants. Standards established by the National Electrical
Manufacturers Association, NEMA, are almost universally employed
in designing the electrical wiring systems for industrial facil-
ities. Even though these standards are not specifically designed
to prevent intrusion by carbon fibers, the NEMA standard enclosures
that assure safe operations in hostile environments are also cer-
tain to preclude ingestion of carbon fibers. In addition, much
industrial wiring is enclosed in conduits attached to terminal
boxes with pipe or other essentially sealed fittings. All such
installations would also be fiber-proof.
NEMA also has standards for spacings between conductor ter-
minals in or on the less well-protected enclosures. Barriers
are frequently prescribed between contacts to create a longer
path for flash-overs if the terminal board were to become con-
taminated. Such spacings and barriers have been established by
experience and serve to protect circuitry against malfunction be-
cause of exposures to carbon fibers. The effectiveness of these
spacings and barriers are examined in section 9 of this report.
These and other features of electrical circuitry were noted in
the industrial surveys conducted and were accounted for in assess-
ing the transfer function for a given installation.
Industrial filters are generally rated according to an "ASHRAE
Dust Spot" number by the American Society of Heating, Refrigeration
and Air-Conditioning Engineers. These numbers are assigned from
tests with reasonably spherical particles normally found in in-
dustrial environments. Because the effectiveness of filters was
expected to differ for fiber particles, a systematic evaluation
of filters with known ASHRAE ratings was performed with carbon
fibers of known length by the Army Ballistic Research Laboratory
(ref. 8-2). The results were plotted as indicated in figure 8-1
and a curve was fitted to the data. This curve was used in the
Bionetics analysis to develop filter factors for individual units
of electrical and electronic equipment in the factories surveyed.
Generally, the filters were more effective in trapping fibers
than spherical particles of equal diameter and more effective
in trapping long fibers than short ones. Thus, the actual exposure
inside an electrical device was expected to have relatively fewer
long fibers than were present in the originally released fiber
cloud. This effect was ignored in the analysis; consequently,
the estimates of transfer functions are expected to be more severe
than would be experienced for a given incident.
8.2 SURVEYS OF INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES
The following four industrial facilities were selected for
the surveys.
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An automotive electronics and electromechanical components
manufacturing plant.
A television receiver assembly plant.
A light truck assembly plant.
A textile fiber production plant.
Some of the characteristics of the facilities are summarized in
table 8-1.
The surveys determined the types of equipment used, the ef-
fect of equipment failures on plant operations, the types of ven-
tilation systems employed and the equipment features which would
be effective in protecting against carbon fibers. This information
provided the basis for estimating the potential for entry of car-
bon fibers into the plants, the extent of equipment and product
failures which would result from carbon fiber exposure and the
economic impact of those failures. The analysis consisted of the
following six steps:
I. A product flow diagram was developed for each factory which
described the principal features of the electrical power supply
system, identified the potentially vulnerable equipment, and in-
dicated the normal protections for the equipment.
2. A modified fault-tree technique was employed to define
the effects of carbon-fiber-induced failures in terms of spoiled
product, lost production time and materials and manpower required
for equipment repair.
3. A cost for each failure was developed based upon estimates
of labor rates, material costs, value of the product and repairs.
4. Transfer functions were developed for the factory and the
equipment enclosures based on the effectiveness of the ventilation,
system, filters and equipment enclosures in restricting fiber entry.
5. The number of failures were estimated based upo_ a linear
failure prediction model for outdoor exposures of E = 10 fiber
seconds/meter3. These calculations utilized an estimated value
of E for equipment items that had not been tested specifically,
but which were generically similar to others for which test data
were available.
6. Cost risk was calculated as the cost of a failure times
the number of failures _redicted from outside exposures of E =
105 fiber seconds/meter_. To a very good first approximation,
the costs for other exposure levels are expected to be in linear
proportion to those reported. For example, costs for E = 103
103
fiber seconds/meter3 are expected to be .01 times the values given.
For reference, an E of 105 fiber seconds/meter3 is very unlikely
to be experienced in fiber-release incidents from civil aircraft
crashes even close to the incident (ref. 8-3).
Because the exposures, E, predicted were usually several
orders of magnitude less severe than the mean exposure E required
to produce a failure, a probability approach was required to as-
sess the likelihood of failure. The relation Pf = E/E was used
-E/E. This approx-
to approximate the true probability Pf = 1 - eimation is valid whenever E << E.
Tables 8-2 through 8-5 present summaries of the risk assess-
ments for each of the four manufacturin_ plants if they were sub-
jected to an outdoor exposure of E = 10D fiber seconds/meter3.
The plant manufacturing automotive components (table 8-2)
has four separate production lines, one for an electronic control
for a fuel injector, one for the injector, one for an electronic
brake control and the fourth for emission-control air pumps.
Each line is fed by a separate 480-volt transformer through a
master switch. Failures of the transformer switches were found
to be the costliest potential failures, because an entire pro-
duction line would be stalled. A recent incident in which such _
a switch failed for another reason gave specific cost information
for such an incident. Items 2 through 8 in table 8-2 list prob-
able costs for failures in each of several portions of the elec-
tronic control production lines. Although each item is critical
to successful operation, the combinations of low transfer function,
low individual costs, and high values of E resulted in very small
potential losses for a fiber incident. A bake-out step (item B)
and the heat-treatment of injectors (item i0) would incur very
high costs, but failure at these stations was very unlikely be-
cause of the very high exposure required to cause a failure.
Loss of control of the ph in waste water from etching processes
could result in significant cost penalties or fines levied by
the local sanitation district (item ii); however, the required
was also high for this failure mode.
The plant assembling television receivers (table 8-3) uses
a relatively large amount of electrical power (12,000 kW), for
plastic processing, for circuit testing, burn-in and life testing.
The plant is fed by 16 oil-cooled 440-V transformers, each rated
at 750 kVA. Failure of such a transformer or its switch (item 8)
is the costliest single potential failure, but the failure is
highly unlikely (E = 108 fiber seconds/meter3). The entire plant
is critically dependent on a single master oscillator (item i)
that furnishes power at a set of standard frequencies against
which to tune the electronic circuitry. This item carries the
highest cost risk in this factory. The parts of the factory that
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deal with processing plastic parts for cabinets and instrument
panels (items 5, 6, i0, ii) would incur significant costs if
failed, but the exposures required to cause such failures make
the risk of such failures a modest concern.
Because the truck assembly plant (table 8-4), is characterized
by a single production line, the failure of a single critical
element, requiring a significant time to correct, could idle the
entire plant. Consequently, failure of the main transformer switch
(item 3), the 440-V distribution system (item i) overhead trolley
system (item 2) and the robotic welder (item 8) could each cause
major costs. However, the E values required to cause such fail-
ures are quite high. On the other hand, spot welders (item 7)
and a 440-V compressor drive (item 6) have relatively high trans-
fer functions, and, therefore, the highest cost risks. Some
equipment, such as welder controls were recognized as being vul-
nerable to a variety of normally encountered failures. Conse-
quently, replacement spares were kept available and repairs would
be accomplished expeditiously with reasonable cost and minimal
impact on productivity.
The plant manufacturing synthetic fibers (table 8-5) operated
by continuous flow in four separate lines. Disruption of power
or loss of control at any one of these lines would be extremely
costly because of the clean-up require_d. Most electrical switch
gear and sensitive controls had high E values or were protected
in cabinets with low transfer functions, so that the cost risks
for components of this plant were generally low.
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TABLE'8-1 FACILITY CHARACTERISTICS
ity I _utomotive Textile
Components TV Receiver Truck Fiber
Characteristic _ Manufacture Assembly Assembly Production
Electrical Equipment Main power Main power Main power Main power
Mar'is. handling Mat'is. handling Mat'is. handling Mar'is. handling
Automated ops Master oscillator Automated welding Process control
Functional test Burn-in Harness test Variable freq. drive
Heat treating Functional test Electrostatic paint
Product Fuel injectors Color TV Pick-up trucks Synthetic fibers
Injector controls Black & white TV Yarn
Air pumps
Mode of Operation 4 lines 7 lines 1 line Continuous process
3 products 7 models 1 product with i0 lines
variations 3 products
o
Ventilation Air conditioned Air conditioned Windows Open
Clean rooms Lint shields
Age < I0 yr. _i0 yr. > 40 yr. _ 20 yr.
Distance from airport 1.6 km 24 km 8 km 13 km
Shifts 2 @ 8 hr. 1 @ 8 hr. 2 @ i0 hr. 3 @ 8 hr.
Work force personnel 750 1700 1900 600
TABLE 8-2 ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL LOSSES
Manufacturer of Automotive Components
Risk if
Vulnerable Transfer _ 3 Max. Cost E = 105
Element Function f.s/m of Failure f.s/m3
Main Transformer Switch 1.6 x 10-2 106 $65,800 $420.00
Fab. Circuit Boards 4.1 × 10-5 106 2,842 .01
Laser Trim Resistors 5.0 × 10-4 106 528 .03
o Integrator & Populator 3.0 x 10-4 106 490 .06
Operational Test 3.0 x 10-4 106 478 .06
Circuit Test 2.3 x 10-5 106 529 .007
Burn-in 6.2 × 10-4 106 252 .01
Bake-out 6.2 x 10-4 107 52,700 .35
Incoming Inspection 7.6 x 10-4 106 314 .i0
Injector Heat Treat 2.2 x 10-3 107 9,920 .65
Waste Water Processing 2.2 x 10-3 107 5,037 .ii
TABLE 8-3 ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL LOSSES
Plant Assembling Television Receivers
Risk if
E = 105
Vulnerable Transfer E0 3 Max. Cost No. of
Element Function f.s/m of Failure Units f.s/m3
Master Oscillator 7.3 x 10-3 l05 $16,400 1 $119.00
Incoming Inspection 7.3 x 10-3 106 6,340 3 9.70
Populator & Integrator 8.4 x 10-3 106 940 2 1.58
Signal Interconnect 4.0 x 10-2 107 34 14 .18
o 0_2Plastic Press 2.5 x 1 107 1,800 20 8.87
Embossing Press 5.5 x 10-4 107 228 20 .02
Encapsulator 2.2 × 10-3 105 1,040 1 2.25
Transformer Switch 5.5 x 10-5 108 26,200 16 .23
440-V Distribution 6.6 × 10-3 106 2,720 6 10.73
Plastic Contamination 4.9 x 10-2 106 2,420 1 .30
Spray Paint 7.9 × 10-2 106 3,760 1 .73
Tuning and Alinement 4.0 x 10-3 105 i.I0 3500 16.00
Burn-in 4.0 × 10-3 105 0.75 3500 9.00
Life Test 3.1 x 10-3 106 2.50 i00 .13
TABLE 8-4 ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL LOSSES
Truck Assembly
Risk if
E = l05
Vulnerable Transfer _ 3 Max. Cost No. of
Element Function f's/m of Failure Units f-s/m3
440-Volt Bus 1 x 10-2 106 $84,000 1 $84.00
Overhead Trolleys 2 × 10-3 106 41,500 6 45.00
Transformer Switch 1 x 10-3 107 435,000 9 39.00
13.2-kV Circuit Breaker 1 x 10-4 107 41,500 9 0.37
ll0-V Aux. Transformer 5 × 10-3 106 6,750 12 40.00
o
440-V Compressor Drive 5 × 10-2 107 23,400 4 460.00
Spot Welder 2.5 x i0-I 106 1,700 50 2,200.00
Robotic Welder 2 x 10-5 107 41,900 2 0.01
Stud Welder 2 x 10-2 106 1,850 2 7.40
-5 107 900 15 0.002Teletype Printer 2 × i0
Electrical Harness Test 1 x 10-2 107 1,670 1 0.16
Electrostatic Paint Spray 1 x 10-4 107 1,700 8 0.01
TABLE 8-5 ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL LOSSES
Textile Fiber Manufacturer
Risk if
5
E = 10
Vulnerable Transfer _ 3 Max. Cost No. of
Element Function f-s/m of Failure Units f s/m3-
13.2-kV Transformer Switch 1 x l0-3 l07 $93,000 6 $5.57
440-V Var. Frequency Drive 1 × 10-3 106 15,000 6 9.10
Chemical Supply 1 × 10-3 107 28,000 24 6.81
i0 6,Hydraulic Power 5 x 10-4 6 600 6 1.97
o
Temperature Control 5 x 10-4 107 3,400 60 1.01
Temperature Reference 5 x 10-5 107 6,700 24 0.08
Bath Control 5 x 10-4 107 5,300 36 0.96
Acrylic Yarn Line
13.2-kV Transformer Switch 1 × 10-3 107 98,000 1 0.98
Nylon Coating Line
13.2-kV Transformer Switch 1 × 10-3 107 41,000 1 0.41
Speed Control 5 x 10-4 106 1,700 2 0.17
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Section 9
CARBON FIBER INDUCED ARCS
Tests were conducted to observe the effects of exposure to
carbon fibers on 460-volt, 60-hertz industrial equipment and to
investigate the occurrence of arcs resulting from the exposure.
The NEMA standards and MIL specifications were examined to
find the minimum spacings allowable between energized parts in
industrial applications and the type of enclosures that would be
most likely to be penetrated by fibers. Exposed buses, wires and
terminals were determined to be the most vulnerable points of an
electrical installation.
Representative components were exposed to carbon fibers to
determine whether or not a sustained arc could be produced in such
components, and, secondly, to determine the average exposure to
create an arc.
9.1 TEST EQUIPMENT AND GENERAL PROCEDURES
Two power sources were used:
A 1500-kw, 460-volt, 60-hertz, 3-phase transformer with a
6900-volt primary. This unit was part of the NASA Langley Research
Center electrical power distribution system.
A 60-kw, 416-volt, 60-hertz, 3-phase diesel-driven generator.
This generator was a portable emergency power supply used at the
NASA Langley Research Center. The voltage was adjusted to 460
volts phase to phase.
Three representative electrical installations were evaluated:
Copper bus bars
Bare copper wires
Terminal boards (MIL-T-Spec 55164, Types TB38 and TB39).
Three characteristic measurements were made:
Current and voltage accompanying arcing.
Arc duration (cycles)
Exposure level (large chamber only).
Three methods of producing an arc were employed:
A carbon fiber was placed across conductors before
energizing the circuit.
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A carbon fiber was placed across conductors after
energizing the circuit.
Airborne carbon fibers (i, 3 or 10 mm long) were
disseminated after energizing the circuit.
A small test chamber was used to conduct qualitative tests
for sustained arcs across pairs of wires and terminal boards.
This chamber was a 1 m by 1 m by 1 m box with a removable side and
several penetrations. Carbon fibers in the box were distributed
by an air jet for the airborne carbon fiber arc tests. Exposures
were not monitored.
The NASA vulnerability exposure test chamber (ref. 9-1) was
used to conduct the tests for sustained arcs between bus bars
and to measure the exposure level required to create an arc across
pairs of wires and terminal boards. This chamber was approximately
2.5 m wide by 2.5 m long by 2.75 m high. Fibers of the specified
length were blown into the chamber from a chopper. Fiber exposure
was monitored by ball detectors described in section 2.1.
The maximum current available in each test was limited by the
line resistance (approximately 0.23 _ per phase). A nichrome wire
variable resistor was used in some tests to further limit the cur-
rent. All tests were conducted with no load connected to the test
components. The lines were fused to protect against damage from
prolonged arcs.
Figure 9-1 is a diagram of the measurement circuitry employed.
Current was sensed by a clamp-on current transformer and voltage
was sensed across only one pair of lines through a l-megohm loading
resistor and a voltage divider, as shown.
9.2 TEST CONDITIONS AND RESULTS
The test conditions and results are summarized in Table 9-1.
Bus-bar tests.- Bare copper bus bars (test i) were exposed
to carbon fibers in the arrangement shown in figure 9-2. The bars
were 6 mm thick, 16 mm wide and 153 mm long. Four pairs of bars
were spaced 12.7, 19.0, 25.4 and 31.7 mm apart. Single-phase power
was fed simultaneously to each pair of bars, but no loads were
connected. Flashovers were noted for pairs of bars spaced at 12.7
and 19 mm, but not for those spaced further apart. Flashovers did
not persist more than ½ cycle. Only single-phase tests were con-
ducted and no attempt was made to establish the exposure levels
required to cause arcs.
Bare-wire tests.- In tests 2 through 4, copper wires, 2 mm in
diameter, were clamped between insulated blocks with their axes
parallel and in a horizontal plane (fig. 9-3). For single-phase
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tests (tests 2 and 3), two wires were side-by-side and spaced 1.5
mm to 38.1 mm apart. The insulation was stripped from the ends of
the wires to expose i0 to 15 mm of bare copper. In some tests,
fibers were laid across the wires before the 460-volt power was
turned on. However, the characteristics of flashovers produced
with this technique and those produced by airborne fibers were
identical.
Arcs produced in single-phase tests fed by the transformer
(test 2) were not sustained beyond the first ½ cycle even for wire
spacings as small as 1.5 mm. The oscillograms in figure 9-4 were
recorded in two identical tests except that the fuse ratings were
different (30A and 60A). Oscillogram A shows that the fuse opened
when the first flashover occurred. Oscillogram B shows that the
fuse survived three flashovers. The traces indicate that the
voltage was reduced to zero instantaneously when an arc formed.
This loss of power allowed the ionized environment to cool so
that the arc was not sustained. Voltage built back to its normal
level until the next fiber made contact and the process was repeated.
Arcs formed in single-phase tests fed by the generator (test
3) were sustained even with wire spacings up to 38.1 mm. The
oscillograms in figure 9-5 show that, when current flowed in the
arc, the voltage led the open-circuit voltage by as much as 30°, and
was 180° out of phase with the current. Although the voltage and
current reached zero at the same instant, a sustaining voltage
was available to reinitiate the arc before it was cooled completely.
Thus, the arc was sustained for from 2 to 3 cycles, depending on
the arc length. The observed phase shifts were attributed to the
inductive character of the generator power source.
For tests of copper wires in three-phase transformer-powered
circuits (test 4), the third wire was mounted below the first two,
so that the three free ends formed an equilateral triangle 9.5 mm
on each side (fig. 9-6). A sustained arc was formed, probably
because the arc across at least one phase was active at any instant
and, thus, preserved an ionized environment that sustained other
arcs when i000 amperes were available. The arcs did not persist if
the circuit was limited to 285 amperes. Figure 9-7 is an oscillo-
gram of current and voltage in one phase of such a test. The arc
persisted for 2.5 cycles, when the fuse failed in one of the other
phases. No three-phase tests were performed with the generator-
power-supply because that configuration was deemed certain to
sustain arcs.
Terminal-board tests.- Terminal boards of two types (38 TB and
39 TB) described in MIL-T-55164 were tested in single and three-
phase circuits powered by the transformer (tests 5 through i0).
The two terminal boards were similar in design, but the spacing
between terminals was different (5.1 and 7.1 mm). The rated cur-
rent capacities were 20 and 30 amperes, respectively. Two or
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three conductors were connected to consecutive terminals with
standard insulated lug connectors (fig. 9-8). No load was con-
nected to the other side of the terminals and seven other terminals
were inactive.
In single-phase circuits, arcs were formed, but were not sus-
tained for more than one half-cycle. In three-phase circuits, arcs
were sustained only if more than 285 amperes of current were avail-
able. The arcs over the 38 TB and the 39 TB terminal boards be-
haved identically.
Exposure levels to sustain continuous arcs were established
by testing additional terminal boards in environments where the
exposure was monitored by ball sensors and chopped fibers were
blown into the chamber in a controlled manner. Four circuit boards
were exposed simultaneously in the arrangement shown in figure
9-8. One of each type of board was oriented vertically and the
other was oriented horizontally. Results are given in Table 9-2
and are plotted in figure 9-9. No sustained arcs were formed
with fibers 1 mm long because several fibers would be needed to
bridge a given terminal spacing. (A higher exposure, E, was re-
quired with 3-mm-long fibers then with 10-mm-long fibers because
of the higher likelihood that two or more long fibers would be de-
posited to bridge the distance over the barriers between terminals).
The required exposure to sustain arcs on vertically mounted boards
was approximately 4 times as great as that for horizontally mounted
boards.
Damage caused by arcs.- Figures 9-10 and 9-11 are photographs
of damage caused by the arcs produced in this study. The copper
wires (figure 9-10) were melted down to their clamping blocks and
the micarta clamping block was severely scorched. The damage to
terminal boards, 38 TB, was severe, but was limited to the affected
terminals (fig. 9-11).
Reference
9-1 Newcomb, Arthur L.: Carbon Fiber Exposure Test Facility and
Instrumentation. NASA TM 80220, 1980.
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TABLE 9-1 - SUSTAINED ARC TESTS
Specimen
Test Spacing, Power Amperes,
-- # Test Specimen mm Phase Source Chamber Rms Results
1 Copper Bus Bar - 12.7 - 19 1 Transformer Large 1000 Flashover - 1/2 cycle
6.3 mm x 16 mm
&
2 Copper Wire 1.52 1 Transformer Small 100<I<1000 Flashover - 1/2 cycle
3 Copper Wire 12.7 - 38.1 1 Generator Small 425 Sustained Arc
4 Copper Wire 9.5 3 Transformer Small 285<I<1000 Sustained Arc
5 38 TB Terminals 5.1 1 Transformer Small i00<I<i000 Flashover - 1/2 cycle
6 38 TB Terminals 5.1 3 Transformer Small <i00 Flashover - 1/2 cycle
7 38 TB Terminals 5.1 3 Transformer Small 285<1<1000 Sustained Arc
8 39 TB Terminals 7.1 1 Transformer Small 100<1<1000 Flashover - 1/2 cycle
9 39 TB Terminals 7.1 3 Transformer Small 285 Flashover - 1/2 cycle
i0 39 TB Terminals 7.1 3 Transformer Small 1000 Sustained Arc
TABLE 9-2 - EXPOSURES FOR SUSTAINED ARCS FOR TERMINAL BOARDS
INDUSTRIAL POWER AT 460 VOLTS, 60 HERTZ, 3 PHASE
-- SECS/METER3E - AVERAGE EXPOSURE TO ARC, FIBERS
Terminal
Board 39 TB (a) 38 TB (a) 39 TB (a) 38 TB (a)
Axis
Fiber_ _ Vertical Vertical Horizontal Horizontal
Length
1 mm > 10 8 > 10 8 > 10 8 > 10 8
3 mm 8.4 x 107 8.7 x 107 1.96 x 107 1.37 x 107
i0 mm 1.27 × 106 1.67 × 106 3.45 x 105 7.48 x 105
(a) From MIL-T-54164
SupplYineA  C amponCurrentTransormero1
"0 0
,0
[ o o
] Waveform Recorder
[
Line B O 0
0
0
Test Specimen
Connections
Dual-Trace "Scope
Line C 0 0
Figure 9-1 Electrical Circuit for Measuring Voltage and Current.
(Line C was deleted for Single-Phase Experiments).
Ra Ll DctectC' .. in .. ILl
EMI Shield ~
Ball
Noise
Detector orCOffiPensat7
Figure 9-2 Bus-Bar Test Configuration.
......
N
o
Figure 9-3 Configuration for Singla-Phase Tests of Copper Wires.
a. Wiro spacing - 1.52 rom
Peak current - 1400 A
30~A fuse opened when
flashover occurred.
b. Wire spacing - 1.52 rom
Peak current - 1400 A
60-A fuse opened after
several flashovers.
Arcs were not sustained.
Figure 9-4 Curren't,-Voltage Traces
for Single-Phase Tests on Wires Fed by a Transformer.
va. Wire Spacing--12:./7._
b. Wire Spacing- _9 mm
Figure 9-5 Current and Voltage Traces for Single-Phase
Generator-Powered Tests of Bare Wires.
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Figure 9-6 Configuration for Three-Phase Tests on Copper Wires.
![ •
Terminal board TB 38
Peak current- 400 A
60-A fuse did not open....
Arc was susta ined
2.5 cycles[
Figure 9-7. Current and Voltage Traces,
3-Phase TeStS
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Figure 9-8 Arrangement of Terminal Boards in Tests to E~tabli.sh Mean Exposure
for Sustaining Arcs.
Industrial Power, 440 V., 60 Hz
Transformer Supply, 285 A<I<I000 A (RMS), Three Phase
Terminal Boards Per Specification MIL-T-55164
10 \\\\ Vertical
Fiber Horizontal __
length,
mm \\\ \_m 3 -
Type Ratinq
39 TB 600 V, 30 A
38 TB 600 V, 20 A
1 | .... I I {
105 106 107 108
E, Fiber-sec/m3
Figure 9-9 - Average exposures to sustain arcs on terminal boards
Figure 9-10 Damage Caused by 460-Volt Single-Phase Arcs in Tests of Copper Wires
Moun ted 1.5 rnUl Apart.
IJ
o I 2 .) 4 5
C/ NllMf If "'> INCill "
o I ?
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·gh % ':'"Y %»w _"Il!IIiI
Figure 9-11 Damage to Terminal Boards, Caused by 460-Volt 3-Phase Arcs.
Section i0
INVESTIGATIONS OF ARCING INCIDENTS
Two cases of anomalous electrical behavior occurred at NASA,
Langley Research Center during this investigation. One was in a
power distribution panel in a manufacturing area for carbon-fiber
composites, and the other in wall receptacles in the carbon fiber
exposure test chamber. The investigations of these occurrences
are reported herein.
10.1 DISTRIBUTION PANEL
An electrical fault occurred in a 3-phase 480-volt ac power
panel located in a carbon-fiber composite fabrication shop at
NASA Langley Research Center. Witnesses stated that a loud sharp
noise was heard and the panel door was blown open at the time of
the fault. The 400-ampere main breaker within the panel and the
substation breaker located outside the building were tripped. The
substation breaker had a 600-ampere frame and the over-current re-
lay was set at 325 amperes. The bus bars or their connectors to
the load breakers were burned. This indicated a phase-to-phase
fault on all 3 phases, but no visible evidence of a fault to
ground.
The damage done inside the panel enclosure was small. It
consisted only of copper spattering on the parts involved in the
fault. The protective circuit breakers operated quickly enough
to prevent further damage.
After the fault, the panel enclosure cover was removed and
all of the load circuit breakers were removed in an effort to
find a foreign object (such as a bolt or wire) which could have
initiated the arcing. No such object was found. After smoothing
the affected parts of the bus with a file, the panel was checked
electrically at 500 volts dc and was found to have open circuits
from phase to phase and from phase to ground. The load breakers
were reinstalled and the panel was again energized. Everything
appeared normal.
This incident occurred in a room where carbon fibers are
"prepregged." Bare carbon fibers are taken directly from a spool,
are passed through a bath that wets the fibers with matrix resin
and are wound on a drum where the composite is partially cured.
A hood collects fumes from the binder and loose fibers emitted
from the operation. The hood exhausts to the roof of the building.
Several fibers, approximately i0 to 30 mm long, were found inside
the electrical panel, which was within 2 meters of the prepreg
machine. The inside of the hood over the fabricating machine had
many (thousands) of carbon fibers adhering to the metal. A filter
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in the exhaust pipe to the roof was heavily coated with fibers
and fibers were found on the louvres at the exhaust vent on the
roof.
The cost impact of this incident was minimal as the machine
was not in use at the time. Less than 25 manhours were spent to
inspect the electrical panel after the incident, to dress the
damage, and to reenergize the panel.
The carbon-fiber environment in the room was monitored by
sticky cylinders such as those described in Section 2.3 of this
report. Eleven cylinders were exposed at various points in the
room for one week at a time during five successive weeks. None
of the samplers were installed inside the electrical panel. No
important differences were noted among the eleven samples taken
in a given week, the data were averaged for each week and are
displayed in Figure i0-i. By far, most of the fibers captured
were less than 1 mm long. These short fibers were not expected
to constitute a threat to the electrical panel that failed.
Conceivably, the total accumulation of longer fibers inside the
panels_during,the four years the prepregging facility was in.:_:o_-:duB
operation_.couldhave,been sufficient to cause a flashover _,:_.z_=,_
(Section 9_of this report). However, the cause of this fau_. __IJ
was not:positively identified. :z_;::!-.i_sJ_
10.2 WALL RECEPTACLES
....-_-Whiie:elecfiricalequipment was being tested in the NASa:iz,;_o:)
Langley_Research Center exposure chamber (ref. 10-1), arcing waso._
observed _at a 4'socket, 3-wire, ll0-volt receptacle mounted oh_i_:_
wall in the chamber. Sparks were apparently caused by carbon :: ....
fibers-that bridged the conductors in the receptacle. Fibers had
to penetrate_about 6 mm into the socket holes to reach conduct0rs!-_
and then ijoin-withother fibers on the receptacle surface to _._:,_;
es_a_bl:_h,a connection. The arcing occurred frequently durih_-gi:4_!_ii_
chamb.er:testingwith fiber lengths from 3 to 16 mm and at- -_. _:,_e
mode-rai-eiexposuresof 104 fiber-seconds per meter . The chamb_r?_'_:
was"$n-ormallyvacuum cleaned between tests; however, some fibers-.J_?_$
probab!y;.accumulatedin the receptacles as evidenced by the oLi.:,:,_j_
foll'bwing, .. ..... -,...." i:" ":.- ........ , ,. F_
:On one occasion, a piece of insulating tape was placed-,:
oyerothe:ireceptaclesin the chamber prior to a test to prev.enh_...,_-_._,-,_"
arcing during the test. However, the tape began to smolder whe_ _:
it was;-pressedto the surface. :Apparently, fibers were lodged[ _......
in the,holes during earlier tests and were disturbed by the . ... ,_
application:of the tape making contact across the conductors_, ,--::, .................... '.,:q[J'_L_t
on another:occasion, after an exposure of 3 x 107 fiber seconds -
per meter3, a quasi-sustained arcing was observed. The reacti0n_:,!:_
lasted,.about 15 seconds, was about 1/4 inch in diameter and ,.:__/_
_esu!ted in slight charring of the socket. :-_:
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Tests were conducted to determine whether the electrical
potential at the wall receptacle was effective in attracting or
repelling fibers. A test jig was made consisting of two recep-
tacle pairs (four sockets). Only one pair of receptacles was
powered. The receptacles were exposed to 3-, 7- and 16-mm-long
fibers at exposures of approximately i08 fiber-seconds/meter3.
Fiber burnouts were seen at the connected receptacles at intervals
during the tests. After each run, the receptacles were inspected
and the fibers in the holes counted under a microscop_. Results
are shown in Table 10-1.
The test data do not indicate any significant attraction of
fibers by the electrical field of the ll0-volt receptacle; how-
ever, burnout of fibers on the energized receptacle may have
biased the test results. Except during the operational cases
cited previously, no presistent arcs were observed. The arcing
was self-limiting when the fibers burned, even at the very high
exposures deliberately used during the receptacle tests. The
flashover arcing observed would be of no importance to most
adjacent electrical equipment; however, a small amount of
radiated electrical noise could affect neighboring sensitive
apparatus.
Reference
10-1 Newcomb, A. L.: Carbon Fiber Exposure Test Facility and
Instrumentation. NASA TM-80220, 1980.
131
TABLE i0-i NUMBER OF FIBERS COLLECTED IN A
4-SOCKET 110-VOLT WALL RECEPTACLE
i Fiber
Ener- Exposure length Pin A Pin B Pin C
Socketi gized f.s/m3 mm (a) (a) (a)
, ,
1 I Yes 50 20 i0
I
2 Yes 3 x 108 3 60 70 10
3 No i00 80 i0
4 No 400 -- i0
1 Yes 7 4 4
2 Yes 8 x 107 7 15 25 4
3 No 3 20 0
4 No I 5 4 0
1 Yes i00 30 18
2 Yes 4 x 108 16 20 16 1
3 No 15 26 3
4 No i0 16 15(b)
a) Pin A at 110 volts, Pin B ground return, Pin C ground.
b) One clump of 15 fibers
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400 " - 2.0x106
Figure 10.1. Fibers Captured by Sticky Cylinders in Carbon-Fiber
Composite Fabrication Shop in Five Successive Weeks.
Section ii
ESTIMATING DAMAGE FROM AIRBORNE CARBON FIBERS
A detailed cost analysis of electrical failures caused by a
carbon-fiber incident is a tedious process involving many steps
(ref.ll-l), and extensive catalogs of data on specific aspects of
the problem. An approximate method suitable for making estimates
"on the back of an envelope" was considered desirable and was de-
veloped. Necessarily, approximations have been made in the in-
terest of simplicity, but results have been in excellent agreement
with many of those derived by more deliberate methods. The method
is described herein. '
The following assumptions were made:
• The total number, N, of fibers released is known. This
number is readily calculated from the mass of fiber involved in
a fire, from knowledge that only one percent of the available fi-
ber is released in lengths of interest, and from the fact that 1
kg of fiber is equivalent to 5 x i0= fibers with an average length
of 3 mm.
• These fibers are distributed uniformly in a static cloud
whose height is h (in m) and whose area is A (in m2).
• The fall velocity, u (in m/s), is known and atmospheric
turbulence is such that the fiber-fall velocity is uniform and
equal to the free-fall velocity at ground level. Free-fall veloc-
ity for single fibers 7 _m in diameter is 0.02 m/s.
• Objects on the ground are exposed to a uniform concentra-
tion, C, of fibers per unit volume in the cloud, or N .
hA
• The exposure time, t, is equal to the height, h, of the
cloud divided by the fall velocity, u.
• Therefore, the exposure E (in fiber seconds/meter3) is
N h N
_x -- or -- .u Au
• The effect of wind speed is to increase the affected area, -
A, and to reduce the corresponding exposure level, E, at the same
linear rate.
• The distribution of potentially vulnerable electrical equip-
ment is uniform over the area, A, with a density D (per m2) esti-
mated for the locality.
• The mean exposure, E, required to fail typical electronic
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devices is known.
• The cost, R, per electrical failure is known. For example,
household equipment is generally not vulnerable except for tele-
vision receivers and similar electronic instruments, whose repair
may cost $i00 per failure.
Given the foregoing assumptions and estimates of the param-
eters in the problem, the probable cost of an incident may be
estimated as follows.
If E is less than 0.i E the probability Pf of having an
electrical failure is
E N
Pf = _ = AuE
and the probable total cost of an incident is
N D R
Total cost = Pf D A R = u E
As a numerical example, let
= 106 fiber-seconds/meter3
D = 4000 devices per km2 (4 x 10-3/m2)
N = 109 fibers released
u = 0.02m/s
R = $i00 per failure
The total cost of this accident is $20,000. However, this
cost is for devices exposed out-of-doors. Most devices are housed
in buildings having transfer functions of one percent or less.
Therefore, the corresponding total cost is more likely to be$20O.
Substitution of values in this simple linear relation serve
to demonstrate the effects of the various parameters in this com-
plex problem. Further, because the calculation starts with an es-
timate of the total number of fibers released in an incident, the
total consequence is estimated in each application. Estimates made
by this simple relation usually have agreed within a factor of two
with those made by more elaborate schemes.
References
ii-i Kalelkar, Ashok S.; Fiksel, Joseph; Rosenfield, Donald;
Richardson, David L.; and Hagopian, John: An Assessment of
the Risk Arising From Electrical Effects Associated with
Carbon Fibers Released From Commercial Aircraft Fires.
Arthur D. Little, Inc., Cambridge, MA, NASA CR 159205, 1980.
135

1. Report No. 2, GovernmentAccessionNo. 3. Recipient'sCatalogNo.
NASA CR-159214
'" 4. Title and Subtitle 5. Report Date
Experimental and Analytical Studies for the August 1980
NASA Carbon Fiber Risk Assessment 6.PerformingOrganizationCode
7 Author(s} 8 Performing Organization Report No
Anon
10 Work Unit No
9 PerformingOr anizationName and Address 534--03--23
Bionetics Corporation
18 Research Drive 11 ContractorGrantNo
Hampton, VA 23666 NASI-15238
13 Type of Report and Period Covered
12, Sponsoring Agency Name and Address Contractor Report
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 14SponsoringAgencyCode
Washington, DC 20546
15. Supplementary Notes
Program Manager, Robert J. Huston; contract managers, Vernon L. Bell,
and Arthur L. Newcomb, Jr., NASA/Langley Research Center,
Hampton, Virginia
16. Abstract
This report describes various experimental and analytical
studies performed for the NASA carbon fiber risk assessment
program. Contained in this report are data and analysis on
carbon fiber characteristics, sensitivity of electrical
equipment and components to shorting or arcing by carbon
fibers, attenuation effect of carbon fibers on aircraft
landing aids, impact of carbon fibers on industrial
facilities, and a simple method of estimating damage from
airborne carbon fibers.
r •
17 Key Words (Sugg_ted by Author(s)} 18 Distribution Statement
Carbon fibers Instrumentation
Electrical hazards Risk assessment Unclassified - Unlimited
/ Household equipment
Avionics Composites
Landing aids Subject category 24
19 S_urity _a_if (of this report) 20 S_urity Classif (of this _ge) 21 No of Pages 22 Dice"
Unolassifled Unclassifled 136 A07
N-305 ForsalebytheNationalTechnicalInformationService,Springfield,Virginia22161


fl
